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By J_ MARTIN WAGNER· 
Government could hardly go on if to some extent values 
incident to property could not be diminished without 
paying for every ___ change in the general law ___ _ 
[Slome values are enjoyed under an implied limitation 
and must yield to the police power_ 
-Oliver Wendell Holmes 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
International law has long protected foreign property from 
expropriation-confiscation by the host-coWltry government-
by giving the owner of the property a right to compensation for 
the value of the lost property_ In recent decades, foreign prop-
erty owners have made claims for compensation based on gov-
ernmental regulations, such as placing restrictions on the legal 
use of property, that do not actually remove the owner's title to 
* J. Martin Wagner is the Director of International Legal Programs for Earthjus-
tice Legal Defense Fund and an Adjunct Professor at Golden Gate University School of 
Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments and assistance pro-
vided by David Wirth, Linda Nowlan and Carlos Baumgarten, and the research assis-
tance of Stephanie Tai and Scott Smithline. 
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the property, but nevertheless substantially affect its value. As 
this doctrine of "indirect expropriation" has developed, interna-
tional tribunals and legal scholars have cautioned that the ob-
ligation to compensate does not extend to regulations imposed 
pursuant to the exercise of legitimate government police pow-
ers, such as taxation and protection of human health and wel-
fare. To require otherwise would, as Oliver Wendell HoInles 
noted, severely limit the ability of governments to promote the 
general welfare. 
In recent decades, the harmful effect of human activities on 
the environment and the connection between environmental 
health and human well-being have become obvious. Recogniz-
ing these relationships makes clear the need for governmental 
restrictions on environmentally harmful activities. In addition, 
a key tenet of environmental protection is that those responsi-
ble for harming the environment should bear the cost of pro-
tecting it. In this light, one might imagine that environmental 
regulations would be safe from claims that their economic im-
pact on private property constitutes indirect expropriation and 
thus gives property owners a right to compensation. In the 
past few years, however, several cases have challenged that 
assumption. 
Like many other international agreements, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) requires compensa-
tion for direct or indirect expropriation of foreign investment. 
In an unprecedented move, companies have begun to use this 
protection to challenge measures promoted by governments as 
necessary to protect the environment and human health. A 
U.S. company running a hazardous waste disposal facility in 
Mexico is seeking $90 million in compensation from Mexico for 
losses incurred when the local government refused to permit 
operation of the plant because of its discovery that the local 
geology made it likely that the waste treated at the plant would 
contaminate local water supplies. Another U.s. toxic waste 
disposal company has claimed that Canada should pay it at 
least $10 million for losses arising out of a 15-month Canadian 
ban on the export of a particularly volatile hazardous waste. 
Canada asserted that the ban was necessary to ensure that the. 
waste would be treated safely, preventing contamination in 
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Canada and the United States that might arise if treatment 
was inadequate. In the most publicized case, a U.S. manufac-
turer of a gasoline additive settled a compensation claim 
against Canada, obtaining a payment of $19 million (it had 
sought $250 million) and convincing Canada to rescind a ban 
on the importation of the additive. Although Canada had ini-
tially promoted the ban as necessary to avoid risks that the 
additive posed to the environment and human health, part of 
the settlement included a statement by the Canadian govern-
ment that it did not have "sufficient evidence" on which to base 
a "clear case" that the additive was causing the asserted harm. 
As these NAFTA cases make clear, giving companies the 
right to base compensation claims on the economic impact of 
environmental regulations has a serious chilling effect on the 
ability and willingness of governments to implement such 
regulations. Governments that do so risk being penalized by 
having to divert precious governmental resources to defend the 
regulations against expropriation claims and to pay compensa-
tion payments if the defense is unsuccessful. Moreover, as the 
Canadian gasoline additive case suggests, such penalties may 
be great enough that a government may not be able to main-
tain a regulation it has deemed necessary. To make matters 
worse, the provisions on which these claims have been based 
are the model for efforts to expand investment protection re-
gionally, in the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), 
and globally, in the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAl) or an equivalent global agreement. 
Despite the claims that have been brought under NAFTA, 
and the one settlement reached, none of the cases has yet been 
resolved by a tribunal. Moreover, the companies making the 
claims have objected that the regulations have not really been 
environmentally motivated. It thus remains uncertain the ex-
tent to which the NAFTA investment protections apply to envi-
ronmental regulations. 
The Canadian government has expressed the desire to draft 
an interpretive "rider" to Chapter 11 to clarify and limit the 
3
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investor-state provisions. 2 The Canadian trade minister has 
suggested that the United States and Mexico support this ef-
fort3 and the ministers have apparently agreed to "focus atten-
tion" on the issue at an April 1999 meeting in Ottawa.4 Can-
ada has proposed making nations' domestic laws on expropria-
tion the standard for international panels to use in investor-
state challenges.5 An attorney who has represented U.S. com-
panies in three NAFTA investment challenges against Canada 
has objected that Canada's position would result in "a defmi-
tion of expropriation that's less than the internationally ac-
cepted defmition of expropriation. "6 However, as this Article 
demonstrates, international law does not require governments 
to provide compensation for the economic impact of most le-
gitimate environmental laws or regulations. Such freedom to 
regulate is necessary if governments are to be able to protect 
the environment. 
NAFTA does not clearly defme the actions covered by its 
expropriation provisions. Interpretation of the provisions will 
thus depend in part on international law and the domestic tra-
ditions of the negotiating parties. This Article argues that both 
international and U.S. law preserve the right of governments 
to regulate to protect the environment without having to com-
pensate for the impact of such regulations on investment. M-
ter a brief description of the relationship between foreign in-
vestment and the environmentin Part II, the Article will de-
scribe the protection against expropriation provided by interna-
tional agreements, briefly discussing bilateral investment 
agreements and then detailing the protection provided by 
NAFTA and the MAl in Part III. Part IV will then describe the 
challenges to environmental laws that have been brought un-
2. Greenwire, Feb. 23, 1999, at 22 (citing JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Feb. 23, 1999). 
3. See AMERICASTRADE, Dec. 24, 1998, at 22·23. According to the Canadian trade 
minister, both the United States and Mexico supported Canada's efforts to narrow the 
interpretation of expropriation in the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl) at 
an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (DECD) meeting. [d. 
4. Greenwire, Feb. 23, 1999, at 22 (citing JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Feb. 23, 1999). 
5. See AMERICASTRADE, Mar. 11, 1999, at 1. Such a clarification would "state that 
no party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment in a man-
ner that would be inconsistent with its own principles of domestic law." [d. at 11. 
6. Barry Appleton, quoted in id. at 12. 
4
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der NAFTA's investment chapter. Next, Part V will examine 
the treatment of indirect expropriation under U.S. and interna-
tionallaw. Part VI will demonstrate that, under NAFTA and 
international expropriation and environmental law, environ-
mental measures should not normally give rise to a right to 
compensation. Finally, the Article will conclude with some 
proposals for ensuring that NAFTA, and other investment 
agreements, do not interfere with the ability of governments to 
take action to protect the environment. 
II. FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
The global influence of foreign private capital has increased 
substantially in recent years. For example, from 1990 to 1996, 
the amount of private capital flowing to developing countries 
increased over tenfold, from US $22 billion to US $244 billion. 7 
The increased flow of private capital directly affects envi-
ronmental protection. Governments compete to attract this 
capital, in large part by changing regulations affecting foreign 
investments.8 One economist studying this phenomenon with 
respect to environmental regulations has concluded that 
a concern to be attractive to foreign investors in a highly 
competitive global economy has kept a lid on 10-
caVnational [environmental] standards or enforcement 
of standards. While there has not been a universal 
"race to the bottom," increased globalization [of foreign 
investment) ... has inhibited a "race to the top" and 
caused environmental commitments to be "stuck in the 
mud.''9 
7. See Gretta Goldenman, The Environmental Implications of Foreign Direct In-
vestment: Policy and Institutional Issues 2 (OECD Conf. on FDI and the Env't, Jan. 29, 
1999), OECD Doc. CCNMIEMEFIEPOC/CIME(98)3 <http://www.oecd:org/daf/env> (on 
file with the author). 
8. See id. at 2, 4 (citing 1997 UNCTAD study indicating that 90% of changes in 
laws governing foreign direct investment ·were aimed at creating a more favourable 
climate for [investment)"). 
9. Lyuba Zarsky, Havens, Halos and Spaghetti: Untangling the Evidence About 
Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment (OECD Conference on Foreign Direct 
5
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As a result of the conflict between the desire to attract in-
vestment and strong environmental protection, greater opening 
of markets to foreign direct investment "may lead to patterns of 
investment and production that are not desirable in that mar-
ket conditions do not adequately allow for the internalization of 
social (including environmental) costs. "10 Internalizing envi-
ronmental costs - meaning shifting the cost of environmental 
harm from society at large to the person causing the harm - is 
a fundamental element of environmental protection. 11 This 
principle, called the "polluter pays principle," was recognized 
internationally in the Rio Declaration on Environment and De-
velopment: 
National authorities should endeavor to promote the in-
ternalization of environmental costs and the use of eco-
nomic instruments, taking into account the approach 
that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of 
pollution. 12 
Investment and the Enviornment, Jan. 29, 1999) OECD Doc. CCNMlEMEF/ 
EPOC/CIME(98)5 at 3. Zarsky concluded that, with respect to the environmental ef-
fects of investment, "regulation matters." Id. at 20. 
10. J(Hans) B. Opschoor, Multilateral AgreeTTU!nts on InvestTTU!nt and the Envi-
ronTTU!nt 9 (OECD Conf. on FDI and the Env't, Jan. 29, 1999) <http://www. 
oecd.org/daf/env> (on file with author). 
11. The polluter pays principle began as an economic principle formulated in the 
1970s by the OECD. The OECD agreed that . 
Itlhe principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution prevention and con-
trol measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmental resources and 
to avoid distortions in international trade and investment is the so-called 
"Polluter-Pays Principle." This principle means that the polluter should bear 
the expenses of carrying out the above-mentioned measures decided by public 
authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state. In other 
words, the cost of these measures should be reflected in the cost of goods and 
services which cause pollution in production and/or consumption. Such meas-
ures should not be accompanied by subsidies that would create significlmt dis-
tortions in international trade and investment. 
Recommendation on Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of 
Environmental Policies, OECD, C(72)128 (1972) (hereinafter "OECD Guiding Princi-
ples"). 
12. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), princ. 16, 
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 876, 879 (hereinafter "Rio Declaration"). The principle, which 
has been called "a general principle of international environmental law," International 
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Cooperation, Nov. 30, 1990, 
pmbl., 30 I.L.M. 733, 736, has been adopted in numerous other international agree-
ments. See, e.g., 1986 Single European Act, June 29, 1987, 1987 O.J. (L 169) art. 
6
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The decision to internalize the cost of pollution or other harm 
to the environment, rather than requiring society in general to 
bear that cost, goes to the very heart of the question of indirect 
expropriation. The United States Supreme Court has explained 
that the determination that the government must pay compen-
sation for the impact of its action on property "is, in essence, a 
determination that the public at large, rather than a single 
owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in 
the public interest. "13 Thus, requiring the government to pro-
vide compensation for the impact of environmental laws or 
regulations on property - i.e., determining that "the public at 
large" must bear the burden of that regulation - is directly at 
odds with the polluter pays principle. 
While this brief discussion clearly suggests that environ-
mental laws and regulations should not give rise to a govern-
mental obligation to compensate in any but the most extreme 
situations, some foreign investors have taken a different view. 
The resolution of this question is thus of great significance to 
both investors and governments: 
[T]o the investor, the line of demarcation between 
measures for which no compensation is due and actions 
qualifying as indirect expropriations [that require com-
pensation] may well make the difference between the 
burden to operate (or abandon) a non-profitable enter-
prise and the right to receive full compensation (either 
from the host State or under an insurance contract). 
For the host State, the definition determines the scope 
of the State's power to enact legislation that regulates 
the rights and obligations of owners in instances where 
compensation may fall due. It may be argued that the 
130r(2), as amended by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (Lf224/l), 
reprinted in 31I.L.M. 247; Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment in 
the Northeast Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, art. 2(2)(b) <http://sedac.ciesin.org/ 
pidpltextslacrclMEofNE.txt.html> (on file with author); Convention for the Protect of 
the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea, Apr. 9, 1992, art. 3(4) <http:// 
www.helcom.filconven92.html> (on me with author); Helsinki Convention on the Pro· 
tection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, March 17, 
1992, art. 2(5), 31 I.L.M. 1312, 1316. 
13. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1995). 
7
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State is prevented from taking any such measures 
where these cannot be covered by public fInancial re-
sources. 14 
III. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 
Nations have codifIed protection against expropriation in 
various forms of international agreements. Although the most 
common source of such protection are bilateral investment 
agreements, nations have begun to include expropriation provi-
sions in multilateral agreements. It is in the context of these 
agreements that the international community will determine 
whether environmental regulations may constitute a compen-
sable expropriation. 
A. BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 
In recent decades, nations have signillcantly increased their 
. use of bilateral agreements to protect foreign investment from 
expropriation. In 1990, there were 435 bilateral investment 
agreements (BITs); by March 1998, that number had iincreased 
to 1300.15 In addition to providing protection for U.S. invest-
ments abroad, the United States sees its BITs as having a "sig-
nificant impact" on the worldwide adoption of U.S. policies on 
the treatment of foreign investment in countries undergoing 
economic reform, and laying "the policy groundwork for broader 
multilateral initiatives in the [OEeD] and eventually, the 
[WTO]."16 
14. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 99· 
100 (1995). 
15. See Alan Larson, Asst. U.S. Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Ag· 
riculutral Affairs, Testimony before the House International &glations Committee, 
Subcommittee on Int'l Econ. Pol) and Trade, Mar. 6, 1998, (visited Jan. 26, 1999) 
<http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/980306_larson_mai.htm> (on me with 
author) [hereinafter Larson Testimony]. Between the mid·1980s and March 1998, the 
United States had negotiated 41 BITs. Id. 
16. US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FACT SHEET: U.S. BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATY PROGRAM (Apr. 16. 1997) [hereinafter FACT SHEETl. 
8
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Nearly all BITs provide protection against expropriation. 17 
The majority also cover indirect expropriation,18 using phrases 
such as "having effect equivalent to ... expropriation," "any di-
rect or indirect measure" of expropriation, "any other measure 
having the same nature or the same effect against invest-
ments," or "all other measures whose effect is to dispossess, 
directly or indirectly, the investors."19 BITs to which the 
United States is party generally provide protection against 
"expropriation or nationalization (directly or indirectly through 
measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization)."2O 
According to a study by the Investment Group of the Negotia-
tors of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, "[i]n all 
cases, the language [of BITs] is broad and allows for coverage of 
so-called 'creeping' or 'indirect' expropriations, that is, meas-
ures having the same effect to expropriation. "21 
Because BITs seldom define expropriation in any detail, the 
general rules of international law should inform the interpreta-
tion of this term.22 Considering expropriation as included in 
U.S. BITs, one scholar has stated: "Consistent with article X, 
paragraph 1 of the U.S. Model BIT, principles of international 
law, and law under the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion, measures taken by competent authorities of either party 
17. See DOLER& STEVENS, supra note 14, at 98. BITs may use different words to 
describe the concept of expropriation, such as "dispossession," "taking," "deprivation" or 
"privation." ld. 
18. See id. at 97,99. 
19. ld. at 100·01. 
20. FTAA INVESTMENT GROUP, INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE: A COMPENDIUM at 19. See also DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 14, at 
102 (citing 1992 U.S. model treaty, art. III). 
21. FTAA INVESTMENT GROUP, supra note 20, at 19. 
22. The United States considers that its BITs provide protection against expro-
priation"in accordance with international law standards." FACT SHEET, supra note 16. 
A few US BITs have elaborated on the meaning of expropriation, stating that it in-
cludes "the levying of taxation, the compulsory sale of all or part of an investment, or 
the impairment or deprivation of its management, control or economic value." DOLZER 
& STEVENS, supra note 14, at 102 (quoting U.S.-Zaire BIT (1984), art. III). See also 
FTAA INVESTMENT GROUP, supra note 20, at 19 (quoting US-Haiti BIT). Professors 
. Dolzer and Stevens have noted that such an elaboration "represents possibly the 
broadest scope in investment treaties with respect to indirect expropriation insofar as 
the inclusion of measures that cause the 'impairment ... of [thel economic value' of an 
investment equates expropriation with a host of measures which might not otherwise 
be considered as such under general international law, let alone under liberal systems 
of domestic law." DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 14, at 102. 
9
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in the legitimate, nondiscriminatory exercise of its police 
power, which reduce an investment value, do not constitute 
expropriation within the meaning of article III [of the Model 
BIT]."23 
B. NAFTA 
The international community has come to believe that using 
BITs to protect investment is "non-transparent and potentially 
inefficient," leading to a shift in favor of a multilateral ap-
proach to investment protection. 24 Consistent with this ap-
proach, Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) regulates the treatment by Parties of foreign 
investors and foreign investments. 25 
The NAFTA investment chapter establishes two kinds of 
requirements with respect to foreign investment. First, each 
country must treat foreign investors or their investments as 
well as or better than it treats any other investments in that 
country. Thus, foreign investors and investments must receive 
the better of6 (a) the treatment provided to a country's own 
investors or investments in like circumstances (national treat-
ment)27 and (b) the best treatment provided to the investors or 
investments of any other nation, whether or not it i'3 a party 
(most-favored-nation treatment).28 Second, the Agreement 
prohibits governments from imposing certain requirements on 
foreign investments. One such provision prohibits celtain per-
23. Pamela B. Gann, The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, 21 STAN. J. 
INT'L L. 373, 399 n. 120 (1985). 
24. -See Opschoor, supra note 10. 
25. North American Free Trade Agreement, December 8 and 17, 1992, Chapter 11, 
32 I.L.M. 638 (1993). The Agreement's defmition of "investment" is extremely broad, 
including an "enterprise"; securities, loans to, or interest in the assets or profits of an 
enterprise; tangible or intangible real estate or other property aCquired for economic 
benefit; and interests from the commitment of capital or other resources to economic 
activities. See id. art. 1139. 
26. See id. art. 1104 (requiring parties to provide "the better of the treatment re-
quired by Articles 1102 and 1103"). 
27. See id. art. 1102. States or provinces of a nation must accord treatment at 
least as favorable as provided to any investor or investment of the country. of which 
they are a part. See id. art. 1102(3). 
28. NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1103. The national and most-favored-nation 
treatment requirements apply to the "establishment, acquisition, expansion, manage-
ment, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments." Id. 
10
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formance requirements, such as requiring foreign investors to 
supply products or services to a specific regional or world mar-
ket, to export a specified volume of their products or services, to 
use a certain amount of domestic components, or to transfer 
technology to an entity in the country's territory.29 Other pro-
visions prohibit imposing nationality requirements on senior 
managers of an enterprise30 or placing restrictions on transfers 
relating to investments, including payments made pursuant to 
arbitration under the investment provisions. 31 
Article 1110 protects against the "expropriation" of foreign 
investments: 
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or ex-
propriate an investment of an investor of another Party 
in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nation-
alization or expropriation of such an investment ("ex-
propriation"), except: , 
(a) for a public purpose; 
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis; 
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 
1105(1);(32] and 
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with 
[subsequent paragraphs specifying valuation of expro-
priations and form and procedure ofpayment].33 
When a foreign investor believes that a government has ex-
propriated its investment, Chapter 11 gives the investor a di-
rect right to force the government of the country in which the 
investment is located into binding arbitration to resolve the 
29. See id. art. 1106. 
30. See id. art. 1107(1). 
31. NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1109. Such transfers also include profits, divi-
dends, fees and payments, and proceeds of sales. See id. 
32. Article 1105(1) provides: "Each Party shall accord to investments of investors 
of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security." 
33. [d. art. 1110. 
11
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claim.34 The investor may submit its claim under one of three 
sets of rules for resolving international investment disputes. 35 
Arbitration is generally conducted by a threE~-member 
tribunal. 36 At the request, or with the approval, of the disput-
ing parties, the arbitrators may seek expert assistance con-
cerning environmental, health, safety or other scientific issues 
of fact.37 Under any of the applicable arbitration rules, the pro-
ceedings and findings of the tribunals are confidential and may 
be made public only if both parties agree.38 It is also important 
to note that the arbitration rules do not permit participation by 
or submissions from interested or affected non-parties. 39 
34. See id. arts. 1115-38. 
35. See id art. 1120(1). These rules are those established by the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Convention on the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 
1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (hereinafter "ICSID Convention"), provided that the disputing 
Party and the Party of the investor are parties to the ICSID Convention (Canada is 
not); the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID, if either (but not both) the disputing Party 
or the Party of the investor is a Party to the ICSID Convention; or the Arbitration 
Rules of the UN Commission on International Trade Law, approved by the UN General 
Assembly on Dec. 15, 1976. Three of the first four NAFTA chapter 11 disputes were 
filed with the ICSID, which is apparently pushing to be the "tribunal of choice" for 
NAFTA challenges. See AMERICASTRADE, June 11, 1998, at 4. 
36. See NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1123. Each party to the arbitration appoints 
one arbitrator and they must agree on the third. See id. If they cannot agree within 90 
days, either party may request that the SecretarY-General of the ICSID appoint the 
remaining arbitrator. See id. 
37. See id. art. 1133. 
38. See e.g., 'Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, ICSID, Rule 32(2) 
(visited April 8, 1999) <http://www.internationalaldadr.comltc1l51.htm> (on file with 
author) ("The tribunal shall decide, with the consent of the parties, which other per-
sons besides the parties ... may attend the hearings.); Rules of Arbitration of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce, art. 21.3 (visited Dec. 15, 1998) 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/html/rulesenglish.htm> (on file with author) (without approval 
of arbitral tribunal, "persons not involved in the proceedings shall not be admitted"); 
id. App. I, Statutes of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC, art. 6 ("The 
work of the Court is of a confidential nature and must be respected by everyone who 
participates in that work in whatever capacity."); id. App. II, Internal Rules of the 
International Court of Arbitration of the ICC, art. 1 (sessions of Court open only to 
members, except upon invitation by Court; documents confidential). The attorney for 
one of the NAFT A chapter 11 claims brought against Canada defended the confidenti-
ality provisions as preventing long and costly court litigation through an agreement to 
provide a greater number of internal documents in return for confidentiality. Inter-
Press Service, Sept. 23, 1998, at 4. 
39. See, e.g., Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, supra 
note 38, art. 21.3. In US courts, individuals or organizations with an interest in a case 
can participate as a "friend of the court" or, if resolution of the case will affect their 
12
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The tribunal must decide the claim in accordance with the 
NAFTA and "applicable rules of international law."40 If the 
tribunal fmds that the Party's action was "tantamount to na-
tionalization or expropriation," it may award monetary dam-
ages and interest, restitution of property and/or costs of bring-
ing the claim.41 
Once an arbitral award is final, the investor has several op-
tions for ensuring that it obtains payment from the country in 
question. First, Chapter 11 requires each Party to ''provide for 
the enforcement of an award in its territory."42 The investor 
may also request that its own government espouse its claim 
before the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, which then must 
initiate an intergovernmental arbitration to determine whether 
the failure to comply with the award is inconsistent with the 
obligations of NAFT A and, if appropriate, to recommend that 
the Party comply.43 Finally, the investor may seek enforcement 
under the international arbitration rules recognized in Chapter 
11. 44 One such rule, for example, requires each government to 
treat arbitration awards 
as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations im-
posed by that award within its territory as if it were a 
fmal judgment of a court in that State. A Contracting 
State with a federal constitution may enforce such an 
award in or through its federal courts and may provide 
that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a fi-
nal judgment of the courts of a constituent state. 45 
I 
rights or interests strongly enough, they can actually intervene as a party. See FED. R. 
Cry. P. 24, FED. R. ApP. P. 29. 
40. NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1131(1). 
41. [d. art. 1135. The arbitrators may not award punitive damages. See id. at 
646, art. 1135.3. 
42. [d. art. 1136.4. 
43. [d. art. 1136.5. 
44. See NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1136.6. 
45. ICSID Convention, supra note 35, at 194, art. 54(1). This requirement is im-
plemented in 22 U.S.C. § 1650(a), which provides that arbitral awards rendered pursu-
ant to the ICSID Convention 
shall create a right arising under a treaty of the United States. The pecuniary 
obligations imposed by such an award shall be enforced and shall be given the 
same full faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a court of 
13
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NAFTA's investment provisions are subject to several provi-
sions regarding the environment. First, the investment chap-
ter itself includes a provision on "Environmental Measures": 
1. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent 
a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any 
measure[46] otherwise consistent with this Chapter that 
it considers appropriate to ensure that investment ac-
tivity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensi-
tive to environmental concerns. 
2. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to en-
courage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety 
or· environmental measures. Accordingly, a Party 
should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to 
waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as an 
encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, ex-
pansion or retention in its territory of an investment of 
an investor.47 
In addition to the investment-specific environmental provi-
sions, several other NAFTA provisions highlight environmental 
issues. The Preamble states the Parties' intention to achieve 
NAFTA's goals "in a manner consistent with environmental 
protection and conservation," to "promote sustainable develop-
ment," and to "strengthen the development and enforcement of 
environmental laws and regulations. "48 
Additional protection for environmental measures is made 
through the incorporation of the general exceptions to the Gen-
general jurisdiction of one of the several States.... The district courts of the 
United States ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction over actions and proceedings 
under [these provisionsl. 
22 U.S.C. § 1650(a). See also LETCO v. Liberia, 650 F. Supp. 73, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 
(court has jurisdiction to enforce award rendered pursuant to ICSID procedures). 
46. NAFTA defines "measure" as including "any law, regulation, procedure, re-
quirement or practice." NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 201.l. 
47. Id. art. 1114. If a Party considers that another Party has relaxed measures to 
attract investment, "it may request consultations with the other Party and the two 
Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement." Ill. art. 1114.2. 
48. Id. pmbl. 
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eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.49 Those exceptions pro-
vide: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not 
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between coun-
tries where similar conditions prevail, or a disguised re-
striction on international trade, nothing in [the GATT] 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforce-
ment by any contracting party of measures: 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health; 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in con-
junction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption. 50 
Any consideration of the treatment of environmental meas-
ures under NAFTA must also take into account the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), 
the "environmental side agreement" to NAFTA 51 In the 
NAAEC, the Parties to NAFTA recognized the need to con-
serve, protect and enhance the environment in their territories 
and reaffmned the importance of "enhanced levels of environ-
mental protection. "52 Among the environmental objectives of 
49. [d. art. 2101 ("GATT Article XX and, its interpretative notes ... [isl incorpo-
rated into and made part of this Agreement.").. The investment chapter specifically 
states that "[iln the event of any inconsistency between this Chapter and another 
Chapter, the other Chapter shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency." [d. art. 
1112. 
50. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194, 262 !hereinafter GATT]. NAFTA clarifies two points regarding these exceptions 
that have been challenged under the GATT procedures: that Article XX(b) includes 
environmental measures and that both living and non-living natural resources fall 
within Article XX(g). NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 2101.1. 
51. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), Sept. 8, 
9,12, 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480. 
52. [d. prmbl. The preamble to the NAAEC also reaffirmed the countries' com-
mitment to the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment and the Rio Decla-
ration on Environment and Development, both of which recognize that "environmental 
protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be 
considered in isolation from it." Rio Declaration, supra note 12, prine. 4. See also 
15
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the NAAEC are to "foster the protection and improvement of 
the environment ... for the well-being of present and future 
generations"; to cooperate to "better conserve, protect and en-
hance the environment," and develop and improve environ-
mental laws and regulations; to "enhance compliance with, and 
enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations"; and to 
"promote pollution prevention policies and practices. "f>3 
One of the NAAEC's most important provisions concerning 
environmental laws and regulations is Article 3: 
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own 
levels of domestic environmental protection and envi-
ronmental development policies and priorities, . and to 
adopt or modify accordingly its environmental laws and 
regulations, each Party shall ensure that its laws and 
regulations provide for high levels of environmental pro-
tections and shall strive to continue to improve those 
laws and regulations. 54 
As these provisions demonstrate, any interpretation or ap-
plication of NAFrA's investment provisions must talce into ac-
count the importance that the Parties placed on preventing the 
agreement from interfering with environmental protection. 
C. THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT (MAl) 
Investment protections like those provided by NAFTA, in-
cluding protection against expropriation, are included in re-
gional agreements in other parts of the worldM and may Boon 
become part of a global investment agreement. The European 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration on the 
Human Environment, June 16, 1972, prine. 6, U.N. Doc. AlConf.48/14, revised by U.N. 
Doc. AlConf.4B114/Corr.1 (1972), 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) ("To defend and improve the 
human environment for present and future generations has become an imperative goal 
for mankind .... "). 
53. NAAEC, supra note 51, art. 1-
54. [d. art. 3 (emphasis added). 
55. See, e.g., An Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Dec. 
15,1987, ASEAN Nations, 27 I.L.M. 612; European Energy Charter Treaty, reprinted 
in UNCTAD, II INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM 539 
(1996). 
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Union and Mexico are discussing a free trade agreement that is 
likely to include investment protections in some form. 56 In ad-
dition, the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) is 
likely to include investment provisions. 57 
The first serious proposal to apply investment protections 
on a global level came from the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), a group of 29 of the 
world's richest countries. 58 Since 1995, the OECD has been 
negotiating the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl), 
the goal of which was to "create a comprehensive investment 
discipline, backed up by a dispute settlement mechanism which 
includes investor to state procedures."59 In October 1998, as a 
result of "significant concerns" regarding the agreement, in-
cluding "issues of sovereignty, protection of labour rights and 
environment, culture and other important matters," the OECD 
indefmitely suspended further negotiations on the agreement. 60 
56. See Mexico, EU FTA Proposals Clash over Coverage of Investment, Services, 
AMERlCASTRADE, Nov. 26, 1998, l. 
57. See AMERlCASTRADE, Nov. 26, 1998 at 1; AMERlCASTRADE, Sept. 17, 1998 at 5. 
The United States considers the NAFTA investment chapter "comparable to a BIT" and 
considers its BITs to "complement and support regional initiatives on investment liber-
alization in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) imd the [FTAA) ini-
tiative." FACT SHEET, supra note 16. 
58. The member countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Re-
public, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Por-
tugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. OECD 
countries share "principles of the market economy, pluralist democracy and respect for 
human rights." OECD, Membership, <http://www.oecd.orglaboutlgenerallmember-
countries.htm> (on file with author). OECD countries produce two-thirds of the world's 
goods and services. See id. See also What is OECD, <http://www.oecd.orglaboutlgenerall 
index.htm> (on file with author). 
59. Jan Huner, Environment Regulation and International Agreements: Lessons 
from the MAl (paper delivered at the Royal Institute for International Affairs Confer-
ence on Trade, Investment and Environment, Oct. 29-30, 1998), <http://www. island-
net.coml-ncfs/maisiteJpov-mai3.htm> (on file with author). 
60. OECD News Release, (Oct. 23, 1998) <http://www.oecd.orglnews_and_eventsl 
releaselnw98-101a.htm> (on file with author). The OECD had temporarily suspended 
MAl negotiations in April 1998, intending to resume efforts in November after a period 
of consultation with representatives of civil society. Environmentalists Claim Victory 
as Talks on Multilateral Investment Pact Founder, 21 INT'L. ENV'T REP. No. 22 at 1053 
(Oct. 28,1998). According to the Secretary of the OECD's MAl Negotiating Group, the 
primary problem with the MAl was that 
its negotiators did not expect to have to sell it politically. Most of the MAI-
negotiators are (were) investment specialists not used to viewing from a politi-
17
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Despite the suspension, there remains a consensus among 
OECD member countries on "the need for and value of a mul-
tilateral framework for investment. The goal should still be 
sought."Iil The OECD's continued interest in the subject is re-
flected in its conference on Foreign Direct Investment and the 
Environment, held at The Hague, January 28-29, 1999.62 It is 
thus likely that efforts to develop such a global investment 
agreement will resume in the near future, possibly under the 
auspices of the WTO.63 In addition, "investment discussions in 
UNCTAD, the WTO, APEC and the FrAA are all looking to the 
MAl as a model for multilateral rules."64 
In April 1998, partly as a result of criticism that the MAl 
negotiations had been too secretive,65 the OECD released what 
cal perspective the concepts that they consider logical and essential parts of an 
investment discipline. ... Least of all [did they expect) to see the MAl por-
trayed as a threat to environmental protection. 
Huner, supra note 59. Huner also notes that "the issue of how the MAl relates to mul-
tilateral environmental agreements (MEA's) was not discussed" during the early years 
of MAl negotiations and, with the exception of Washington, was likely "not a subject 
for debate in [national) capitals either." Id. The Chairman of the Negotiating Group 
made a last-ditch effort to salvage MAl negotiations by proposing a package of envi-
ronment and labor provisions, but "the Europeans saw too many NAFTA-inspired 
texts, and the Americans opposed making the not lowering of standards clause bind-
ing." Id. 
61. OECD News &lease, supra note 60. 
62. See Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment, <http://www.oecd.org/dafl 
env/index.htm> (on file with author). 
63. See 21 INT'L. ENV'T REP. No. 22 at 1053, supra note 60. Opschoor, supra note 
10. The April 1998 OECD ministerial declaration stated that the OECD governments 
"support the current work programme on investment in the WTO and once the work 
programme has been completed will seek support of all their partner, for the next 
steps towards the creation of investment rules in the WTO." OECD, Ministerial 
Statement on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl), Apr. 28, 1998, (visited 
on Oct. 26, 1998) <http://www.oecd.orgllnews_and_eventslreleaselnw98-50a.htm> (on 
file with author). 
64. Larson Testimony, supra note 15. 
65. The Secretary ofOECD's MAl Negotiating Group (NG) has explained that 
[w)hen pressure from NGO's [concerning the secrecy surrounding MAl 
negotiations) began to rise, the chairman of the NG suggestt.'Ci that 
NG documents, in particular draft texts, had perhaps better be de-
classified. This was not approved by a minority of countries. One of 
the arguments for not releasing texts was that in doing so [the OECD 
countries) might find ourselves having to negotiate with NGO's.about 
them. This prompted Canada to say that it had already put draft 
texts on the Internet site of the ministry, and it would continue to do 
so. 
Huner, supra note 59. 
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it called the "MAl Negotiating Text," which was a consolidation 
of "the text of the agreement considered in the course of the 
MAl negotiations" to that point,66 and an official Commentary 
to the draft.67 Although the text is far from final,68 and the 
schedule and process for further negotiations are unclear, it 
indicates the basic thrust of discussions to this point. 
With a few exceptions, the fundamental provisions of the 
draft MAl are essentially the same as those ofNAFTA.69 Thus, 
the Negotiating Text requires the better of national and most-
favored-nation treatment,70 and prohibits performance re-
quirements 71 and limitations on transfers. 72 
With respect to expropriation, the MAl Negotiating Text is 
essentially identical to the NAFTA provision. 73 Like NAFTA, 
66. The MAl Negotiating Text (as of 24 April 1998) <http://oecd.orglldaflcmisl 
mailmaitext.pdf> (on file with author) [hereinafter MAl Negotiating Text]. 
67. Commentary to the MAl Negotiating Text (as of 24 April 1998) 
<http://www.oecd.orglldaf/cmislmailMAICOME.PDF> (on file with author) [hereafter 
MAl Commentary]. 
68. The text results "mainly from the work of expert groups and [has} not yet been 
adopted by the MAl Negotiating Group." [d. 
69. One such exception is the MAl Negotiating Text's definition of "investment," 
which is broader than NAFTA's. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 11, 1.2 & n.2. 
According to the OECD Commentary to the MAl Negotiating Text, the definition is 
intended to cover "all recognized and evolving forms of investment [and} would include 
the products of an investment." MAl Commentary, supra note 67 (emphasis in the 
original). The Commentary further indicates support for expanding the definition of 
investment-via the inclusion of assets controlled "indirectly" -to include investments 
owned or controlled by non-MAl investors, as long as there is some connection to an 
MAl investor, as through a subsidiary from an MAl country that directly controls the 
investment or by virtue of the parent of the investor being from an MAl country. [d. at 
6. An investment of a domestic investor would even be covered if the investor was 
owned or controlled by a foreign investor from an MAl member country. See id. at 2(d). 
70. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 13, III. The MAl Commentary ex-
plains that national treatment is violated by de facto as well as de jure discrimination. 
MAl Commentary, supra note 67, at 8. 
71. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 18, III. 
72. [d. at 59, IVA. 
73. The Secretary of the MAl Negotiating Group noted that the Ethyl-Canada 
NAFTA dispute, described infra, text accompanying notes 106-134, had caused MAl 
negotiators to "think twice before copying the expropriation provisions of the NAFTA." 
Huner, supra note 59. Nevertheless, the draft MAl provision was nearly identical to 
the NAFTA provision: 
A Contracting Party shall not expropriate or nationalise directly or indirectly 
an investment in its territory of an investor of another Contracting Party or 
take any measure or measures having equivalent effect (hereinafter referred 
to as "expropriation") except: 
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the Negotiating Text does not defme "expropriation," but the 
Commentary notes that by extending protection to "measures 
having equivalent effect" to expropriation, the Text was in-
tended to cover "creeping expropriation."74 
The MAl Negotiating Text follows the NAFTA example for 
dispute settlement as well, providing investors the l'ight to ini-
tiate binding arbitration concerning claims that government 
action has violated the Agreement and caused "loss or damage 
to the investor or its investment."75 Although the Text estab-
lishes procedures allowing a nation to challenge another na-
tion's failure to abide by the provisions of the agreement,76 it 
gives priority to challenges brought against nations by inves-
tors. 77 
Like NAFTA, if the three-member arbitral panel that fmds 
that a country has violated the Agreement, it may award 
monetary compensation for injury or losses suffered by the in-
vestor78 and restitution in kind (meaning the return of the 
property in question). 79 In a state to state arbitration, the 
panel may also recommend that the losing Party bring its ac-
tions into conformity with its obligations under the 
a) for a purpose which is in the public interest, 
b) on a non-discriminatory basis, 
c) in accordance with due process of law, and 
d) accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensa-
tion .... 
MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 57, IV.2.2.1. 
74. MAl Commentary, supra note 67, at 3D, IV.2.5. 
75. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 63, V.D. 
76. [d. at 63-69, V.A-C. 
77 . A Contracting Party may not initiate proceedings under this Article 
for a dispute which its investor has submitted, or consented to submit, 
to arbitration under [the MAIl, unless the other Contracting Party 
has failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in that 
dispute or those proceedings have terminated without resolution by 
an arbitral tribunal of the investor's claim. 
[d. at 65, V.C.l.b. 
78. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 67, V.C.6.c (state-state disputes, 
proceedings and awards); id. at 75, V.D.16.a (investor-state disputes, final awards). In 
investor-state arbitration, interest from the time of loss or damage is also available. 
See id. 
79. In a state-state arbitration, restitution is available only with the agreement of 
the losing Party; in an investor-state arbitration, the losing Party need not agree, but 
has the right to pay monetary compensation instead, if restitution is "not practicable." 
[d. at 67, V.C.6.c (state-state); id. at 75, V.D.16.a (investor-state). 
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Agreement.SO The MAl Negotiating Text provides for enforce-
ment of arbitral awards through domestic law, in the case of 
investor-state disputes ,81 and through retaliatory sanctions m 
the case of state-state disputes. 82 
At least some MAl negotiators wanted the agreement to 
recognize environmental concerns.83 This gave rise to a pro-
posal for a ''three-anchor [environmental] approach": 
The fIrst anchor would be the preamble, which should 
reaffirm Parties' commitment to the relevant principles 
of the Rio Declaration and to the relevant multilateral 
agreements. [84] The second anchor would be a provision 
80. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 67, V.C.6.c.ii. 
8!. [d. at 76, V.D.16.c ("An arbitration award shall be fmal and binding between 
the parties to the dispute and shall be carried out without delay by the party against 
whom it is issued, subject to its post-award rights under the arbitral systems util-
ised."), V.D.18 ("Each Contracting Party shall provide for the enforcement of the pecu-
niary obligations imposed by an award rendered pursuant to [the investor-state arbi-
tration provisionsl."). 
82. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66 at 69, V.C.9. The Negotiating Text is 
not very well developed on this point. The draft proposes two alternative provisions for 
giving enforcement powers to states that have received a favorable award with which 
the challenged state has not complied. One allows the state to "take measures in re-
sponse" to the noncompliance. [d., V.C.9.a. The other allows it to "suspend the appli-
cation to the other Contracting party of obligations under this agreement" other than 
the obligations relating to general treatment and expropriation. [d., V.C.9.a-b. The 
Text also proposes giving all of the other parties to the MAl some role in approving 
such measures and suspending the non-complying party's right to participate in deci-
sions concerning the Agreement. [d. V.C.9.c. 
83. According to the Secretary of the Negotiating Group, not all OECD members 
agreed that the MAl should address the environment. Until the victory of the Labour 
party in the United Kingdom, the UK took a contrary position. See Huner, supra note 
59. Other opponents were Australia, New Zealand, Korea and Mexico ("perhaps the 
strongest critic"). [d. In addition, these "anchor" environmental provisions were 
"poorly received in business circles, particularly in the United States." [d. Even the 
United States-which, in the Secretary's opinion, was the only nation with experience 
(from the NAFTA debates) in the relationship between investment and the environ-
ment-did not raise environmental issues until late in the negotiations. [d. 
84. One draft of the MAl's preamble reaffirmed the parties' commitment to sus-
tainable development and expressed their recognition that "investment, as an engine of 
economic growth, can play a key role in ensuring that growth is sustainable, when 
accompanied by appropriate environmental policies to ensure it takes place in an envi-
ronmentally sound manner." OECD, MAl Draft, October 6,1997, <http://www.oecd.org/ 
daflcmis/mailnegtext.htm> (emphasis added) (on file with author). The 1998 Negoti-
ating Text proposed a different version: 
[Recognizing that appropriate environmental policies can playa key role in 
ensuring that economic development, to which investment contributes, is 
sustainable,) and resolving to [desiring to) implement this agreement [in ac-
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built on NAFTA Article 1114, stating that environ-
mental and social standards as contained in national 
laws and regulations should not be lowered in order to 
attract an investment. The main debate here has been 
whether or not this should be a binding provision. 
NAFTA 1114 only says that such lowering of standards 
is "inappropriate." The third anchor was investor per-
formance on environmental protection.85 
In addition, the United States proposed adding a general envi-
ronmental exception, essentially identical to NAFTA Article 
1114(1).86 
Finally, the Negotiating Text proposed to recognize the 
right of each country to establish its own levels of domestic en-
vironmental protection and environmental development poli-
cies and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its envi-
ronmental laws and regulations.87 The Text proposes to im-
plement this understanding through an interpretive note to the 
expropriation provision clarifying that the provision does not 
require compensation for investment losses due to "regulation 
... and other normal [governmental] activity in the public in-
terest. "88 
cordance with international environmental law andl in a manner consistent 
with sustainable development, as reflected in the Rio Declaration on Envi· 
ronment and Development and Agenda 21, [including the protection and 
preservation of the environment and principles of the polluter pays and the 
precautionary approachl. 
MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 7-8 (brackets in original). 
85. Huner, supra note 59. 
86. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 123. The exception proposed by 
the United States would have provided: "Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise 
consistent with its Agreement that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment 
activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental con-
cerns." ld. In testimony before Congress, Alan Larson, Assistant U.S. Secretary of 
Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, stated that a primary US objective in the 
MAl is "to ensure that the MAl contributes to the achievement of our goal of fostering 
stronger global efforts to protect the environment ... and to achieve sustainable devel-
opment." Larson Testimony, supra note 15. 
87. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 123. 
88. ld. at 141. The Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Economic and Business 
Affairs noted that these provisions would implement the understanding that "[nlormal 
regulatory actions, even when they affect the value of an investment, should not be 
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IV. CHALLENGES TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS UNDER NAFTA 
487 
As noted above,89 international arbitration proceedings are 
extremely confidential. In addition to excluding those who may 
be directly affected by the results of the arbitration, this se-
crecy makes it very difficult to obtain complete and accurate 
factual information regarding NAFTA expropriation claims. 
The cases described in this section are based on information 
that is publicly available. With one exception (the Ethyl case), 
none of the parties to the arbitration has made its submissions 
public. It is therefore possible that these descriptions omit cer-
tain relevant factual information or legal claims. Nevertheless, 
the case descriptions clearly demonstrate the conflict between 
the NAFTA expropriation provisions and government efforts to 
protect the environment. 90 
considered as an expropriation requiring compensation." Quoted in Alan Larson, Envi-
ronmental, &gulatory Safeguards, 15 ENVI'L. FORUM 46, 51 (1998). 
89. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. . 
90. To date, there have been eight claims brought under NAFTA's investment 
provisions. The cases described in the text are those that raise the issues discussed in 
this article most clearly and with respect to which the clearest factual information is 
available. A summary of the other claims follows. 
Pope & Talbot v. Canada I Pope & Talbot, Inc., a Delaware-based wood-products 
company, obtains approximately 75% of its wood from British Columbia. See Pope & 
Talbot SEC Filing, Form 10-K, Wood Products Business, Mar. 31, 1998; see also Pope & 
Talbot SEC Filing, Form 10-Q, Nov. 13, 1998. The most lucrative portion of the wood 
products business is lumber production which accounted for $219,698,000.00 in sales 
for the company in 1997. See id. In 1996, pursuant to the CanadalUS Softwood Lum-
ber Agreement, the two nations agreed to establish volume quotas for each company 
shipping Canadian softwood lumber to the United States. See Pope & Talbot SEC 
Filing, Form 10-K, Wood Products Business, Mar. 31, 1998. In the second year of this 
regime, Pope & Talbot's quota was decreased from what it had been the previous year. 
See id. Claiming that this reduction was unfair, the company filed a notice of intent to 
initiate arbitration under NAFTA's chapter 11 on February 17, 1999. Pope & Talbot 
Press Release, Pope & Talbot Issues Challenge to Unfair Softwood Quota (Feb. 17, 
1999) <http://www.poptal.comllnews.htm> (on file with author). If negotiations be-
tween Pope & Talbot and Canada do not resolve the dispute, the company may initiate 
arbitration in May 1999. 
DESONA v. Mexico: Desechos Solidos de Naucalpan (DESONA), a US waste man-
agement company, claims that the council of the Mexican county of Naucalpan nullified 
a 15-year waste management concession between the two parties. On December 9, 
1996, DESONA notified the government of Mexico of its intent to file a claim through 
the ICSm Additional Facility Rules and in March 1997 it filed a notice of claim with 
the ICSm. ICSm has accepted and registered the claim, and the first session of the 
arbitral tribunal was to be held September 26, 1997. No further information concern-
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A THE METALCLAD CASE 
In 1995, the Mexican federal government authorized 
Quimica Omega de Mexico, a subsidiary of the US-based 
Metalclad Corporation, to take over and operate a toxic waste 
facility in the Mexican state of San Luis Potosi. 91 The facility 
had a history of contaminating local groundwater. Metalclad 
reportedly spent $22 million preparing the facility. 92 
From before the outset of this project, Metalclad was aware 
that its "proposed business in Mexico is highly regulated and is 
subject to Mexican Environmental law."ga This law regulates 
both the construction and operation of hazardous waste facili-
ing this claim is available. USTR Update on WTO, NAFTA Dispute Settlement Cases 
(visited on May 3, 1999) <http:www.usia.gov/topical/econlwtolwtxt0919.htm> (on file 
with author). See also West, AMERICAN LAWYER, Dec. 1997, available in LEXIS, News 
Library, Magazine File. 
Sun Belt Water Inc. v. Canada: In 1990, six companies, including Snowcap Water, 
held licenses issued by the government of British Columbia (BC) for the bulk export of 
what was considered "surplus" water. Public opposition to these exports on conserva· 
tion grounds lead to a temporary moratorium on water exports and, eventually, the BC 
Water Protection Act, RS.B.C. Chapt. 484 (1996) (Can.), banned such exports perma-
nently. In 1996, the BC government settled with Snowcap for $335,000, the amount it 
had spent creating an infrastructure to export water. In December 1998, Sun Belt, a 
US corporation that was a partner in a joint venture with Snowcap, brought a claim 
under NAFTA's Chapter 11 for as much as US$219 million for lost business opportuni-
ties resulting from the ban. Sun Belt's claims are based on violations of the national 
treatment and minimum standard of treatment provisions. Sun Belt Filing, 
AMERICASTRADE, Dec. 24,1998, at 13. 
Loewen Group v. United States: The Loewen Group, a Canadian funeral services 
firm, brought a NAFTA investment claim against the United States after it lost a civil 
contract suit brought by a competing US funeral services company in Mississippi court. 
The court awarded the US company $500 million and Loewen, which had filed for 
bankruptcy, was unable to pay the requisite 125% bond to appeal the case. Loewen 
brought the NAFTA claim on the basis that the suit against it violated NAFTA's na-
tional treatment, minimum treatment and expropriation provisions. AMERICASTRADE, 
Nov. 26,1998, at 20. 
USA Waste v. Mexico: A US waste management company, USA Waste, brought a 
NAFTA Chapter 11 claim at the ISCID against Mexico based on the city of Acapulco's 
failure to pay for street sweeping services provided by USA Waste under a 15-year 
concession agreement signed in 1995. AMERICASTRADE, June 11, 1998, at 3-4. 
91. According to Metalclad, it was "invited" to operate the facility. See Metalclad 
Announces It Has Suspended Construction in Mexico, Metalclad Corp. Press Release, 
Sept. 30, 1998. See also Carmelo Lodise, San Miguel's Draining Struggle, BUSINESS 
MEXICO, Dec. 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Magazine File. 
92. See Joel Millman, Metalclad Suit Is First Against Mexico Under NAFTA For-
eign-Investment Rules, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, October 14, 1997, at A2. 
93. Metalclad SEC Filing, Form 10-KT (Apr. I, 1997), Item 1(a). 
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ties, and requires environmental impact studies and permits 
from the National Institute of Ecology (lNE), as well as local 
and state agencies.94 Operation of such facilities and compli-
ance with INE regulations is subject to continual monitoring by 
the Federal Attorney for the Protection of the Environment. 95 
Environmentalists and local citizens were not satisfied with 
the environmental impact assessment for the facility, and suc-
cessfully pressed the local government not to permit its opera-
tion.96 In late 1996, the· Governor of San Luis Potosi deemed 
the facility to be an environmental hazard to surrounding 
communities and ordered the Metalclad waste facility shut 
down.97 The Governor's decision was supported by a geological 
audit performed by environmental impact analysts at the Uni-
versity of San Luis Potosi, who found that the facility was lo-
cated on an underground alluvial stream and could therefore 
contaminate the local water supply.98 The Governor subse-
quently declared the site part of a 600,000 acre ecological 
zone. 99 
On January 2, 1997, Metalclad filed a claim with the ICSID 
against the Mexican government under the NAFTA investment 
chapter. loo The complaint alleges, among other things, that 
"having been denied the right to operate its constructed and 
permitted facility, its property has therefore been, as a practi-
cal matter, expropriated, entitling the Company to the fair 
94. See id. 
95. See id. 
96. See Trying to Give the NACEC Teeth, in LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL REPORTS: 
MEXICO AND NAFTA REPORTS 4 (May 9, 1996). 
97. Antonia Juhasz, Update on Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico, in GLOBAL-
IZATION AND THE MAl (Feb. 2, 1998.) 
98. See Preamble Center for Public Policy, Update on Metalclad Corporation v. 
Mexico (visited on Jan. 28, 1999) <http://www.islandnet.coml-ncfslmaisite/efTect 
13.htm> (on file with author). ' 
99. See id. See also Guadalcazar, zona ecol6gica en SLP; descartado, reabrir el 
confinamiento, NOTICIERO PECUARIO, 17 Sept. 1997 (visited Feb. 3, 1999) 
<http://www.veterin.unam.mxlfmvzunamlI7sep97.htm> (on file with author). 
100. See Metalclad, SEC filing, Nov. 20, 1998, <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
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market value of the facility as damages. "101 Metalclad asserted 
that the facility was worth $90 million. 102 
In July 1997, a three member arbitration tribunal met to 
address the claim. 103 On October 13, 1997, Metalclad fIled a 
memorial that included the claim and all the evidence sup-
porting the claim, including expert witness studies. On Febru-
ary 17, 1998, the Mexican government fIled a response, to 
which Metalclad replied on August 21.104 Mexico responded 
with a number of procedural objections concerning allegations 
and evidence that Metalclad should be permitted to submit. 105 
On November 13, 1998, the tribunal rejected Mexico's com-
plaints and ordered Mexico to respond on the merits of the case 
by March 19, 1999.106 
B. THE ETHYL CORPORATION CASE 
In April 1997, Canada enacted a law making it a crime to 
import, or trade between provinces, manganese-based sub-
101. Metalclad SEC filing, Apr. I, 1997; Metalclad SEC filing, Nov. 20: 1998, 
<http://www.sec.gov/Archivesledgar/datalI3547/0000013547·98·000023.txt> (on file 
with author) (characterizing its claim as "one likened to expropriation. The Company's 
position is since it is not being allowed to operate a legally authorized project, it has in 
essence been taken by the Mexican government."). Metalclad also argued that Mexico 
violated the national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment requirements and 
had imposed illegal performance requirements. See Juhasz, supra note 97, The na-
tional treatment violation is apparently based on the assertion that the refusal to per~ 
mit Metalclad's facility to operate is intended to protect a Mexican waste disposal com-
pany called Rimsa. See Fernando Cesarman, Buen Periodismo, EI Destino de la Bas-
ura, EXCELSIOR: Editorial, 18 Aug. 1997 (visited on Feb. 24, 1999) <http://excelsior. 
com.mxl97081970818/art07 .html>. 
102. See Metalclad SEC filing, form 10-Q, Nov. 20, 1998, <http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archivesledgar/datalI3547/0000013547-98-000023.txt> (on file with author); Juhasz, 
supra note 97. 
103. Under the arbitration rules, each party has the right to select one panel mem-
ber; the third is chosen jointly. Metalclad appointed former US Attorney General 
Benjamin R. Civiletti. See Jim Bryan, TechStocks.com discussion group, Metalclad 
Corp. (MTLC) (June 9, 1997) <http://www4.techstocks.com/-wsapilinvestor/Subject-
15440:> (on file with author). The third arbitrator is from Great Britain. See Metalclad 
SEC Filing, Form 10-Q, Nov. 20, 1998. 
104. See Metalclad SEC Filing, Nov. 20, 1998, <http://www.sec.gov/Archivesl 
edgar/datalI3547/0000013547-98-000023.txt> (on file with author). 
105. See id. 
106. Id. Metalclad "expects to request an oral hearing to be held as soon as possible 
after Mexico's final filing, following which a decision is expected to be rendered by the 
Tribunal." Id. 
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stances, including methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricar-
bonyl (MMT), a fuel additive designed to prevent automobile 
engine knocking. 107 Automobile manufacturers had asserted 
that MMT harms automobile on-board diagnostic systems, 
which in turn could lead to a failure to detect high levels of 
pollutant emissions. 108 According to Canada's Environmental 
Health Directorate, excess exposure to manganese compounds 
can cause adverse neurological effects, leading to symptoms 
similar to mild Parkinson's disease. 109 
On April 14, 1997, five days after the ban passed the Par-
liament and eleven days before it received Royal Assent, Ethyl 
Corporation, a U.s. corporation with a wholly-owned Canadian 
subsidiary that is the sole Canadian importer, processor and 
distributor of MMT, filed notice of arbitration pursuant to 
NAFTA's investment chapter. llo Among other allegations, the 
notice claimed that the Canadian law constituted an expropria-
tion of Ethyl's business in Canada, subject to the compensation 
107. See Manganese-Based Fuel Additives Act (MBFAA), Ch. 11, 1997 S.C. (Can.). 
I am indebted to David A. Wirth, Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, for 
his work in uncovering and untangling many of the facts of this claim. 
MBFAA gave the Minister of the Environment limited authority to waive the prohi-
bition for uses other than as gasoline additives. [d. § 5. According to Ethyl, use as a 
gasoline additive is "a principal use of MMT," although "MMT is also used by Ethyl 
Corporation in other fuel products." Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada, Notice of 
Arbitration Under Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law and the North Americ~ Free Trade Agreement 6 (Apr. 14, 1997) 
!hereinafter Notice of Arbitration] (on file with author). 
108. For a summary of the scientific evidence concerning these possible effects and 
a discussion of the treatment of MMT by the US EPA, see Jesus Juanos I Timoneda, 
The Legal Dynamics of the Regulation of MMT: Air Quality Standards and the Salt 
Lake City Airshed, 17 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL L. 283 (1997), in which the author 
concludes that there are "numerous, diverse, sometimes conflicting, reasons to support" 
all positions concerning the use of the additive, but that one variable, "the incidence of 
MMT's combustion products on the amount of particulate matter in a given airshed," 
"deserves considerable regulatory attention ... because of its proven harmful effects on 
health and welfare." [d. at 307,312. 
109. See ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH DIREcrORATE, HEALTH CANADA, RISK AS-
SESSMENT FOR THE COMBUSTION PRODUcrS OF METHYLCYCLOPENTADIENYL MAN-
GANESE TRICARBONYL (MMT) IN GASOLINE (Dec. 6, 1994). At least some studies sug-
gested a health risk due to breathing exhaust from cars running on gasoline containing 
MMT. A University of Quebec neurophysiologist stated in April 1996 that tests on 
laboratory animals suggested that exposure to manganese could speed up the aging 
process, and that young children "may be particularly at risk" because of the potential 
for the deterioration of brain tissues. SOUTHAM NEWS, Apr. 20, 1996 (visited on June 
11, 1998) reprinted in <http://www.achilles.netl-jameshlmmt.htm> 
110. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107. 
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requirement ofNAFTA's article 1110.111 Ethyl sought US $250 
million in compensation for the expropriation of its investment 
in Canada. This amount included loss of sales and profits in 
Canada,112 loss of value of Ethyl Canada,113 loss of "world-wide 
sales due to other countries relying on" the measures taken by 
Canada, "the cost of reducing operations in Canada," expenses 
incurred in "defending itself against allegations made by Can-
ada" and lobbying to defeat the law, 114 and its "goodwill both 
inside and outside Canada. "115 
Ethyl cited international law in support of its expropriation 
claim. In particular, Ethyl stated that bilateral investment 
treaties, "which are substantially similar to the NAFTA's in-
vestment protection provisions" have been interpreted as re-
quiring compensation for "indirect expropriation": "'Where the 
effect is similar to what might have occurred under an outright 
expropriation, the investor would in all likelihood be covered 
under most BIT provisions.mUG According to Ethyl, 
An expropriation therefore exists whenever there is a 
substantial and unreasonable interference with the en-
joyment of a property right .... Article 1110 of the 
NAFTA does not prevent governmental regulatory ac-
tions. It requires governments to compensate investors 
111. See id. at 3,10-18. The notice also alleged violations ofthe national treatment 
obligations of NAFTA's article 1102, through discriminatory treatment of a US inves-
tor. Ethyl noted that the Minister of the Environment had stated that nothing would 
keep Ethyl from building a MMT production plant in Canada and that "[t]here is no 
reasonable or plausible explanation why domestically produced MMT is permitted for 
sale in Canada while imported MMT is not." Ethyl also argued that the ban imposed a 
performance requirement-in the form of an effective requirement that MMT sold in 
Canada "have 100% Canadian content"-in violation ofNAFTA article 1106. [d. at 13. 
112. Ethyl noted that "the sale of MMT represents some 50% of Ethyl Canada's to-
tal sales revenue." [d. at 11. 
113. Ethyl threatened that the 50% loss of sales revenue "could cause the parent 
company to re-evaluate maintaining a Canadian operation." [d. at 12. 
114. [d. at 18. 
115. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 6, 15-18. In its Notice of Arbitration, 
Ethyl claimed that "the Government's statements [concerning the additive] created 
public distrust" and "animosity" towards MMT. [d. at 6, 15. 
116. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 10 (quoting DOLZER & STEVENS, su-
pra note 14, at 100). 
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for interference with their property rights as set out in 
the NAFTA.117 
Ethyl argued that the Canadian measure was a discrimina-
tory attempt to protect domestic industry, rather than a legiti-
mate restriction for environmental or health reasons. Ethyl 
asserted that the Canadian Ministry of Health ''has concluded 
that MMT does not pose a threat to human health and no inde-
pendent studies have concluded that MMT harms automobile 
diagnostic systems."118 According to Ethyl, if the ban had been 
a health or environmental measure, Canada would have en-
acted it pursuant to the authority of the Canadian Environ-
mental Protection Act (CEPA), which provides authority for the 
regulation of the production and manufacture of toxic sub-
stances. 119 Ethyl claimed that there had not been sufficient 
scientific support for the government of Canada to prohibit 
MMT under CEPA or Canadian health laws. 12O Ethyl sup-
ported its discrimination claim by noting that MMT was only 
one of a number of fuel additives that Canada could have 
regulated; that Ethyl, a foreign corporation, was the sole manu-
facturer of MMT; and that the law '\vill not ban MMT com-
pletely, but will make foreign-made MMT inaccessible to con-
sumers in Canada. "121 For its part, the Government of Canada 
117. ld. at 11. Ethyl also noted that Canada's Minister ofInternational Trade had 
pointed out, in a letter to the Minister of the Environment, "that Canada's proposed 
legislation could constitute a measure tantamount to expropriation ... [and] could be 
inconsistent with Canada's NAFTA ... investment obligations." ld. at 12 (citing Letter 
of the Hon. A. Eggleton to the Hon. S. Marchi (February 23, 1996». 
118. ld. at 4. See also ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH DlRECfORATE, supra note 109, at 
69 (concluding on the basis of exposure assessment that "all analyses indicate that the 
combustion products of MMT in gasoline do not represent an added health risk to the 
Canadian population"). 
119. Canadian Environmental Protection Act, R.S.C., Ch. 16, §§ 12, 14 (4th Supp. 
1985) (Can.) [hereinafter CEPA]. 
120. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 5, 14-15. CEPA allows the govern-
ment to regulate toxic substances, including "the· total, partial or conditional prohibi-
tion of the manufacture, use, processing, sale, offering for sale, import or export of the 
substance or a product containing the substance." CEPA §34(1)(l). The Act defmes a 
substance as toxic if it may have a harmful effect on the environment or constitute a 
danger to human life. ld. § 11. The Act provides that, in assessing toxicity, the Minis-
ter of Health or of the Environment "may" collect data concerning the nature and ef-
fects of the substance. ld. §15. 
121. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 4. In fact, there were reports that 
some Canadian gasoline refmeries had continued to use MMT that they had stockpiled 
before the ban took effect. John Urquhart, Canada Lifts Ban on Ethyl's Additive; U.S. 
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claimed that it had restricted trade in MMT, as opposed to its 
production, sale or use, because the Canadian constitution, 
which shares environmental authority between federal and 
provincial governments, places production and intraprovincial 
use of a product beyond the legislative authority of the Cana-
dian parliament. 122 
With respect to the alleged lack of scientific support for the 
Canadian law, Ethyl characterized the law as a "performance 
requirement,"I23 with respect to which measures to protect life 
or health or to conserve exhaustible natural resources are per-
mitted only if they are "necessary."124 Ethyl stated that "[t]he 
lack of any clear scientific evidence throws into doubt whether 
[the Canadian MMT measure] is necessary to protect human 
life or health. "125 
Ethyl also cited jurisprudence interpreting GATT's Article 
XX(b), which permits restrictions on trade where they are "nec-
essary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. "126 
Ethyl noted that GATT panels have interpreted "necessary" to 
mean that the measure in question must be ''the least trade 
restrictive measure possible. Hl27 Ethyl argued that an outright 
Firm to Terminate Its Legal Fight, WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 21, 1998 reprinted in 
1998 WL-WSJ 3502397. 
122. See Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment 
and Natural Resources, Issue 12 - Evidence (Feb. 19, 1997) at 7, <http://www.parl.gc. 
calenglishlsenate/com-e/enrg-e/12ev-e.htm> (visited Apr. 7, 1999) (testimony of Mr. 
Jacques Fremont, Faculty of Law, University of Montreal) ("[U]nder the Canadian 
Constitution, the provinces have full jurisdiction in relation to the production and the 
manufacture of products of goods, including gasoline."); Debates of Senate (Canada), 2d 
Sess., 35th Parliament, Vol. 136, Issue 61 (Dec. 12, 1996), (visited Apr. 7, 1999) 
<http://www.parl.gc.calenglishlsenate/deb-e/61db-e.html> (statement of Sen. Noel A. 
Kinsella) ("the manufacturing of petroleum and that of automobiles falls under provin-
cial jurisdiction"). 
123. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 12-13. Ethyl argued that because the 
Canadian law banned only import and interprovincial trade in MMT, it could manufac-
ture and sell MMT in Canada only if it built manufacturing and blending facilities in 
each province. See id. at 13. The ban, therefore, required MMT sold in Canada to have 
100% Canadian content and required Ethyl Canada to purchase all of its MMT from 
Canadian producers. See id. 
124. NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1106. 
125. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 14. 
126. See GATT, supra note 50, art. XX(b). 
127. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 14 (citing Restrictions on Importation 
of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT Doc. SD10/R, 37 B.I.S.D. 200 (1989-1990». 
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ban on MMT, as opposed to a trade restriction giving domestic 
producers an advantage over foreign producers, would be less 
trade restrictive. l28 For that reason, according to Ethyl, the 
Canadian law could not be considered "necessary."129 
In July 1998, after a Canadian domestic trade panel ruled 
in favor of several provincial governments that had brought a 
claim that the ban violated Canada's Agreement on Internal 
Trade,130 the government of Canada announced that it had set-
tled Ethyl's NAFTA challenge. The settlement provided for a 
payment of approximately US $13 million, including roughly 
$4.5 million for legal fees. 131 In addition, the Minister of the 
Environment, Christine Stewart, issued a letter to Ethyl stat-
ing: "Current scientific information fails to demonstrate that 
MMT impairs the proper functioning of automotive on-board 
diagnostic systems. Furthermore, there is no new scientific 
evidence to modify conclusions drawn by Health Canada in 
1994 that MMT poses no health risk."132 In a subsequent news 
conference, Ms. Stewart said she remained concerned about 
allegations concerning MMT, but stated: "[W]e do not have suf-
ficient scientific evidence at the moment on which to base a 
128. See id. 
129. [d. 
130. Agreement on Internal Trade, R.S.C. Chapt. 17 (1996) (Can.). The Agreement 
on Internal Trade (AIT) applies principles of nondiscrimination and elimination of 
trade obstacles to trade among provincial and other governments. The dispute resolu-
tion panel established by the AIT agreed with the governments of Alberta, Quebec, 
Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia that the ban on manganese-based substances was a 
restriction on the right of movement across provincial boundaries and an obstacle to 
internal trade, both of which are prohibited by the AlT. REPORT OF THE ARTICLE 1704 
PANEL CONCERNING A DISPUTE BETWEEN ALBERTA AND CANADA REGARDING THE 
MANGANESE-BASED FuEL ADDITIVES ACT (Fil no. 97198-15-MMT-Po58 June 12, 1998). 
The panel found that the manganese ban did not satisfy the AIT exception for other-
wise legitimate governmental measures because the government had not demonstrated 
that there existed "'such urgency or a risk so widespread as to warrant such compre-
hensive restrict[ionls as the Act provides on internal trade.'" AMERICASTRADE, July 23, 
1998, at 14 (quoting decision of the AIT panel). The AIT panel considering the internal 
trade ramifications of the law had concluded that the automobile manufacturers' "evi-
dence as to the impact of MMT on the environment is, at best, inconclusive." [d. at 15. 
The panel did note that it did not consider the law to be a "disguised restriction" on 
internal trade. [d. at 14. 
131. See Order Amending the Schedule to the Manganese-Based Fuel Additives 
Act, SOR198-393, C. Gaz. 1998.II.2265 (July 20,1998). See also Government of Canada 
Statement on MMT (July 20,1998). 
132. Quoted in Shawn McCarthy, Failed Ban Becomes Selling Point for MMT, THE 
GLOBE AND MAIL, July 21, 1998 at A3. 
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clear case that MMT in gasoline is causing severe problems to 
either the environment or the health of Canadians. "133 With 
respect to the effect on automobile emissions systems, Ms. 
Stewart stated that, in introducing the ban in 1995, the gov-
ernment had relied on evidence from the auto industry that 
had seemed "quite persuasive," but that the industry evidence 
. now appeared insufficient.l34 She also stated that the Cana-
dian government had not banned MMT directly because there 
was no proof that it was toxic at low levels of exposure. 135 
C. THE SD MYERS CASE 
On July 22, 1998, shortly after Canada settled the Ethyl 
claim, SD Myers, Inc., a U.S. corporation with a facility to dis-
pose of PCB wastes in Ohio, fIled a claim against Canada for 
"not less than" $10 million, plus fees, costs and interest,l36 for 
losses arising out of a 15 month Canadian ban on the export of 
PCBs, which the company claimed to have been "tantamount to 
expropriation" of its contracts to treat Canadian PCBs. 137 
133. Jd. Both the automobile industry and some environmental groups continue to 
express concern regarding the effects of MMT. The president of the Canadian Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers Association stated that the automobile industry had submitted 
over 40 papers demonstrating MMT's effect on emission controls. See id. In addition, 
preliminary studies by a neurotoxicologist at the University of Quebec apparently 
suggest that "even low levels of manganese in the blood can have health effects, par-
ticularly in children and the elderly." Shawn McCarthy, Threat of NAJ.'TA Case Kills 
Canada's MMT Ban, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, July 20, 1998 (visited on July 21, 1998) 
reprinted in <http://www.theglobeandmail.com ... 9980720/GlobeFrontlummtn.html>. 
The author of the study stated: "We know that in large concentrations, airborne man-
ganese does pose a risk to human health. What we don't know is at what level does it 
not pose a risk. There remain a lot of questions about manganese and we should know 
a lot more about it before we use it." Jd . 
. 134. Urquhart, supra note 121. 
135. THE GLOBE AND MAIL, July 21, 1998, supra note 132. See also THE GLOBE AND 
MAIL, July 20, 1998, supra note 133 ("Former environment ministers Sheila Copps and 
Sergio Marchi both argued that they couldn't ban MMT directly because Health Can-
ada had found there was not sufficient evidence that it was toxic at low levels. So they 
resorted to the trade ban."). 
136. Reports have placed SD Myers's estimate of its losses as high as $30 million. 
See Ian Jack, Feds Face Lawsuit over PCBs: 1995 Ban under Nafta, FINANCIAL POST, 
Oct. 30, 1998 at C8; U.S. Company Seeks Compensation for Losses Due to Canadian 
PCB Export Ban, 21 INT'L ENV'T REP. No. 18 at 848 (company claims losses of $15 
million). S.D. Myers's claim for fees and costs apparently included expenses incurred 
in the company's opposition to the Canadian ban. 
137. 21 INT'L. ENV'T REP. No. 18, supra note 135, at 848. 
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Since 1977, U.S. law has prohibited the manufacture, proc-
essing and distribution in commerce of PCBS.I38 Pursuant to 
, this law, EPA banned the imPOrl and export of PCBs in 1980.139 
Although the law allowed EPA to grant individual one-year 
exemptions from this prohibition in certain circumstances,140 it 
rarely did so. 141 Canada fIrst banned the export of PCB wastes 
in 1990, although at that time it permitted the return of U.S. 
government-owned PCB wastes to the United States for dis-
posal. 142 In 1992, Canada ratifIed the Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and their Disposal,l43 which prohibits countries from exporting 
hazardous wastes, including PCBs, to nonparties like the 
United States without ensuring that they will be managed in 
an environmentally sound manner. 144 Canada implemented 
these obligations in the Export and Import of Hazardous Waste 
Regulations. 145 In December 1994, the United States proposed 
138. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(3)(A). 
139. EPA Final Rule, Disposal of Polychlorinated Biphenyls; Import for Disposal, 
61 Fed. Reg. 11096 (Mar. 18, 1996). According to EPA, it had closed the border to PCB 
transports "primarily because of both limited disposal capacity in the United States 
and no appropriate disposal capacity in Canada." Id. at 11101. 
140. 15 U.s.C. §2605(e)(3)(B). The Administrator may only grant such an exemp-
tion if there will be no "unreasonable risk of injury to health or environment" and "good 
faith efforts have been made to develop a chemical substance which does not present 
an unreasonable risk ofiJ:Uury to health and the environment and which may be substi-
tuted for such [PCBI." 15 U.S.C. §2605(e)(3)(B)(i)(ii). 
141. EPA Final Rule, Disposal of Polychlorinated Biphenyls; Import for Disposal, 
61 Fed. Reg. 11096 (Mar. 18,1996). 
142. Environmental concerns must be addressed before Canada permits PCB waste 
exports, ES&E, May 1996, <http://www.esemag.com/0596lpcb.html> (on fIle with 
author) (hereinafter "ES&E"). 
143. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal, Mar. 22,1989, UN Doc. UNEPIIG.80/3, 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989) 
(entered into force May 5,1992) (hereinafter "Basel Convention"). 
144. The Basel Convention requires Parties to prohibit the export of hazardous 
wastes, including PCBs, if they have "reason to believe that the wastes in question will 
not be managed in an environmentally sound manner." Id. art. 4.2(e) (prohibition), 
Annex 1 (listing PCBs). In addition, Parties may not export PCBs to non-Parties, id. 
art. 4.5, unless they enter into an arrangement or agreement that does not "derogate 
from the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes" as required by the 
Convention. Id. art. 11.1. The United States has signed, but not ratified, the Basel 
Convention. 
145. Export and Import of Hazardous Waste Regulations, S0R/92-637, P.C. 1992-
2284, Nov. 12, 1992. The regulations prohibit the export of hazardous wastes to coun-
tries that are not party to the Basel Convention or the Canada-U.S.A. Agreement on 
the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste. Id. art. 6(c). 
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to amend its PCB regulations to allow limited transhoundary 
trade in PCB wastes beginning in mid-1996. 146 
In October 1995, the United States granted SD Myers "en-
forcement discretion" to begin importing Canadian PCBs the 
following month. 147 The following month, Canada temporarily 
banned the export of PCBs to the United States because Can-
ada was "uncertain about the fmal contents of the U.S. regula-
tory amendments governing PCB waste imports" and "lacked 
assurance that Canadian PCB wastes, if exported to the U.S., 
would be managed in an environmentally sound manner."148 
The ban was implemented pursuant to authority under .the 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act to issue "interim or-
ders," which 
can be made if a substance deemed toxic under CEPA, 
in this case PCBs, is not adequately regulated, and im-
mediate action is required to deal with a significant 
danger to the environment or to human life or health. 149 
146. See EPA Final Rule, Disposal of Polychlorinated Biphenyls; Import for Dis· 
posal, 61 Fed. Reg. 11096 (Mar. 18, 1996). In particular, instead of requiring persons 
wishing to import PCBs for disposal to apply for a case·by-case exemption, importers 
would only have been required to provide EPA notice of the importation of PCBs 45 
days prior to the intended importation date. Id. at 11097, 11107. 
147. ES&E, supra note 142. 
148. Id. Canada's PCB Waste Export Regulations, 1996, explain the concern reo 
garding PCBs: 
Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) are very stable substances; they 
are resistant to chemical and physical degradation. They are also 
persistent and bioaccumulate in living organisms and are capable of 
penetrating the food chain. Consequently, PCBs have been listed in 
Schedule I of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) as 
toxic. Furthermore, once released into the atmosphere, PCBs can 
travel extremely long distances. As a result, they are regularly 
found in the Great Lakes Region and also in remote area such as the 
Arctic. 
Canadian Dept. of Env't, PCB Waste Export Regulations, 1996, Regulatory Impact 
Analysis Statement, <http://www.hazmatmag.comllibraryIPCBRegs96IPCBRegs96e. 
html> (on file with author) (hereinafter "Waste Export Regs. Impact Statementn). 
149. CEPA, supra note 119, Chapt. 16, § 15.3 (1985), Interim Orders 35. Once an 
Interim Order is made, it can only remain in effect if the minister issuing the order 
"offerlsl to consult with the governments of all affected provinces within twenty-four 
hours after making the Order to determine whether they are prepared to deal with the 
significant dangern and "consultlsl with other Ministers of the Crown to determine 
whether any action can be taken under any other Act of Parliament to deal with the 
significant danger.n Id. The Interim Order banning PCB waste exports to the United 
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In February 1996, the Canadian Ministers of the Environ-
ment and Health announced that the ban would remain in 
place until Canada was assured that PCB wastes exported to 
the United States would be treated appropriately.l50 Canada's 
concern regarding PCB treatment was explained in subsequent 
legislation lifting the ban: 
Landfilling does not destroy PCBs, consequently, the po-
tential for future environmental contamination contin-
ues. In addition, landfilling requires maintenance and 
monitoring in perpetuity. If Canadian PCB wastes are 
allowed to be landfilled in the United States, they could 
escape into the environment and, because of their ca-
pacity to volatilize and to be transported over long dis-
tances, they could affect the health of Canadians and 
Canadian's [sic] environment as well as that of other 
countries. Furthermore, as a party to the Basel Con-
vention, Canada is required to ensure that any exports 
of hazardous wastes, including PCB wastes, be disposed 
of in an environmentally sound manner. Since guide-
lines adopted by Parties of the Basel Convention do not 
consider landfilling of PCB wastes to be environmen-
tally sound, Canada has an obligation to ensure that 
Canadian PCB wastes are not exported for landfilling in 
the United States. 151 
In March 1996, the United States issued new regulations 
governing the import of PCB wastes. 152 After reviewing the 
regulations, Canada rescinded its ban, allowing exports of PCB 
wastes "for treatment and destruction but not for landfilling," 
beginning in February 1997.153 The Canadian Ministry of the 
Environment explained that the new regulations would allow 
PCB waste exports to the United States 
States was entitled Regulations Amending the PCB Waste Export Regulations (Interim 
Order). See PCB Waste Export Regulations, 1996, Description, <http://www. 
hazmatmag.com/libraryIPCBRegs96IPCBRegs96e.html> (on file with author). 
150. ES&E, supra note 142. 
151. Waste Export Regs. Impact Statement, supra note 148. 
152. EPA Final Rule, Disposal of Polychlorinated Biphenyls; Import for Disposal, 
61 Fed. Reg. 11096 (Mar. 18,1996). 
153. Waste Export Regs. Impact Statement, supra note 148. 
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only if the Department of the Environment has the 
guarantee that: these wastes will be treated and de-
stroyed in an efficient and environmentally sound man-
ner; and, the U.S. EPA has been informed and has ac-
cepted that these PCB wastes enter that country. 
Therefore, as mentioned in the news release by both 
Ministers, the Regulations will allow exports of Cana-
dian PCB wastes and these wastes will be allowed only 
for treatment and destruction and thus ensuring that 
any export of Canadian PCB wastes will be managed in 
an environmentally sound manner. 1M 
In addition to the direct effect of ensuring safe disposal of 
PCB wastes, Canada noted that lifting the export ban had sig-
nificant other environmental and economic benefits. These 
included decreased risk of exposure to PCB wastes due to 
shorter transport distances for wastes located near disposal 
facilities in the United States; lowered cost of PCB waste dis-
posal due to increased competitiveness among a larger number 
of available disposal facilities and shorter transportation dis-
tances; and increased destruction of PCBs due to the lowered 
cost, resulting in less likelihood of exposure and less storage 
and cleanup expenses. 1M In July 1997, a U.S. Court of Appeals 
overturned EPA's new import regulations, ruling that EPA was 
bound by U.S. law to consider individual exemption applica-
tions on a case-by-case basis. 156 
SD Myers's NAFTA claim is apparently based on contracts 
that it had with a group of Canadian companies to dispose of 
their PCB wastes. 157 The company alleged that the ban gave "a 
monopoly on PCB treatment to an Alberta company."I58 
154. [d. 
155. [d. 
156. Sierra Club v. EPA, U8 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir. 1997). 
157. See InterPress Service, Sept. 23, 1998, at 4. 
158. Greenwire, Aug. 24, 1998, at 2 (citing JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, 8t24). Accord-
ing to SD Myers's attorney, the Canadian ban "hurt S.D. Myers Inc. simply because it 
was an American company." InterPress Service, Sept. 23, 1998, at 4. 
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v. INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION UNDER DOMESTIC 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The question at the heart of this Article is one of interna-
tional law - specifically, whether international law protects 
the right of governments to implement environmental meas-
ures that affect property interests without becoming obligated 
to compensate for those effects. Despite the international na-
ture of the question, the Article will fust briefly describe U.S., 
Canadian and Mexican law regarding regulatory takings. It 
will do so for a number of reasons. 
First, whereas relatively few international tribunals have 
considered whether regulations affecting the value of property 
give rise to an obligation to compensate, U.S. courts have con-
sidered the question in some detail. Canadian courts have also 
addressed the issue, although less frequently. U.S. law is also 
likely to have a strong influence on the development of interna-
tional law in this area, because, as one of the leading capital-
exporting states, it "will contend for the transference of the sys-
tem of property protection in [its] domestic sphere onto the in-
ternational sphere. "159 Canada and Mexico have similar moti-
vation, although widely differing ability, to make international 
law reflect their systems. In addition, domestic laws help to 
define "general principles of law," which are one of the sources 
of international law. 160 
Conversely, international law concerning regulatory expro-
priation could have a strong effect on the ability of the United 
States to regulate to protect the environment or other impor-
tant societal concerns. In the famous words of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, " [i]nternationallaw is part of our law."161 More 
importantly, however, as a party to numerous agreements 
159. M. SORNARAJAH. THE INTERNATIONAL LAw ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 294 
(1994). Sornarajah notes that "[t]here is evidence of such a transference in the past" 
and that "[t]he pervasive influence of the American jurisprudence on the taking of 
property is evident in modern discussions on taking in international law." [d. The 
United States intends that the expropriation standards in the MAl will be "consistent 
with U.S. legal principles and practice." Larson Testimony, supra note 15. 
160. See infra note 241. 
161. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677. 700 (1900). 
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regulating expropriation, including the NAFrA, and a pro-
moter of the globalization of these rules, the U.S. government 
and its citizens must be aware of the degree to which interna-
tionallaw may support or conflict with U.S. law. If, for exam-
ple, international law and agreements were to require compen-
sation for a wide variety of environmental regulations - a po-
sition already advanced by a number of companies seeking to 
use the NAFTA to obtain compensation for the impact of laws 
on their investments - the ability of the United States to pro-
tect its environment could be profoundly limited. 162 The same 
is true for Canada, Mexico and all other countries of the world. 
A. REGULATORY TAKINGS UNDER DOMESTIC LAw 
The U.S., Canadian and Mexican legal systems provide 
varying degrees of protection to private property. Neverthe-
less, as the following descriptions demonstrate, they share a 
common understanding that the government is not obligated to 
compensate for the economic impact of most legitimate regula-
tory action. 
1. Regulatory Takings Under U.S. Law 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees 
that private property shall not "be taken for public use without 
just compensation. "163 Until 1922, the Supreme Court had con-
sidered that the Constitutional requirement of compensation 
applied only to direct takings - those in which the government 
took full title to private property.l64 In Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, the Court first recognized what have been called 
"regulatory takings," stating that "while property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking."I65 The Court has been less than clear, 
162. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 159, at 299 ("If, each time there is a [regulatory] 
measure against a foreign investor, he could allege a taking in international law which 
needs to be compensated, regulatory measures against foreign investors could become 
impossible."). 
163. US. Const. amend. V. 
164. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 500 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992). 
165. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). The distinction between a direct taking and a regu· 
latory taking is still relevant: "A 'taking', may more readily be found when the interfer· 
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however, in defining what is "too far." Rather than establish-
ing a definitive test for when a regulation becomes a taking,l66 
the Court has determined that the analysis depends on an "ad 
hoc, factual inquir[y] into the circumstances of each particular 
case,"167 and has identified three factors that are particularly 
significant in undertaking this inquiry.l68 Although these three 
factors must be applied on a case-by-case basis, one scholar has 
noted that "it is quite difficult to establish a [regulatory] taking 
under [the Court's] ad hoc approach, in part [because of] the 
sensitivity of the courts to the important purposes of govern-
ment regulation and the reciprocal advantages of economic 
regulation. "169 
The first factor in the Supreme Court's regulatory taking 
analysis is "the nature of the governmental action. "170 Regula-
tions that cause the government to "physically invade or per-
manently appropriate"l7l the property in question automati-
cally require compensation "no matter how minute the intru-
sion, an'" no matter how weighty the public purpose behind 
it."172 Lesser interference, on the other hand, that "arises from 
a public program that adjusts the benefits and burdens of eco-
nomic life economic life to promote the common good ... does 
not constitute a taking requiring Government compensation."173 
ence with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government ... than 
when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens 
of economic life to promote the common good." Penn Central v. New York City, 438 U.S. 
104, 124 (1978). 
166. See Lucas,505 U.S. at 1015 (Court has "generally eschewed any set formula 
for determining how far is too far, preferring to engage in essentially ad hoc, factual 
inquiries" (quotations omitted». 
167. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Calif. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 
U.S. 602, 643 (1993) (quotation omitted). 
168. [d. 
169. Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Leg· 
islation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187,203 (1997). 
170. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 643. 
171. [d.; Connolly v. Trustees of the Operating Engineers Pension Trust, 475 U.S. 
211, at 225 (1986). 
172. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
173. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 643. See also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022 ("IGlovern-
ment may, consistent with the Takings Clause, affect property values by regulation 
without incurring an obligation to compensate-a reality we nowadays acknowledge 
explicitly with respect to the full scope of the State's police power"); Connolly, 475 U.S. 
at 225; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125 (where the State "reasonably conclude lsI that 'the 
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As the Court has explained, "such restrictions are the burdens 
we must all bear in exchange for the advantage of living and 
doing business in a civilized community."174 
Regulations also must "substantially advance legitimate 
state interests. "175 The Supreme Court has recognized as le-
gitimate, and thus not requiring compensation, regulations ad-
dressing a host of environmental or human health problems. 176 
These have included regulations prohibiting smoke 
emissions; 177 requiring the construction of roadside flood-control 
devices;178 limiting the size of buildings to "avoid unnecessary 
conversion of open space land to strictly urban areas, thereby 
protecting against the resultant adverse impacts such as air, 
noise, and water pollution, ... disturbance of the ecology and 
the environment, ... and other demonstrated consequences of 
urban sprawl";179 prohibiting the sale of items made from en-
dangered species; ISO regulating the sale and use of peBticides; 181 
banning the import of baitfish from other states to protect na-
tive fish from exogenous parasites; 182 requiring the destruction 
of diseased trees to protect local orchards; 183 banning brickyard 
operations in a residential area because of their adverse im-
pacts on human health; 184 restricting coal mining activities to 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare' would be promoted by prohibiting particular 
contemplated uses of land," compensation need not accompany prohibition). 
174. Ruckelshaus v. Mansanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007 (1984) (quotation omitted). 
175. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015·17 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260). 
176. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022 (There exists "a long line of this Court's cases sus· 
taining against Due Process and Takings Clause challenges the State's use of its 'police 
powers' to enjoin a property owner from activities akin to public nuisances" (citations 
omitted)). 
177. See Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916) (no valid con· 
stitutional objection in fact that regulation "may require the discontinuance of the use 
of property, or subject the occupant to large expense in complying with the terms of the 
law"). 
178. See Chicago & A.R. Co. v. Tranberger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915). 
179. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262 (zoning regulation limiting buildings to single-family 
dwellings, accessory buildings, and open-spaces uses substantially advanced the cited 
interests). 
180. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-68 (1979) (refusing to require compensa-
tion when a ban on the sale of eagle feathers made it impossible for the claimant to sell 
certain items he had intended to sell). 
181. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1007. 
182. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
183. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928) (due process challenge). 
184. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.s. 394,410-11 (1915). 
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protect the environment and public welfare; 185 regulating or 
banning the manufacture or sale of alcoholic beverages to pro-
tect "public health, public morals, and the public safety"; 186 and 
protecting visual access to the ocean. 187 
The second factor that the Supreme Court has identified in 
considering whether a regulatory taking requires compensation 
is "the severity of the economic impact" of the governmental 
action. l88 The Court has stated that a regulation will usually 
constitute a compensable taking if it "denies all economically 
beneficial or productive use" of the property in question. 189 On 
the other hand, "mere diminution in the value of property, 
however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking. "190 
185. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 
295 (1981) (statute prohibiting mining near certain locations and regulating conditions 
under which any mining could be conducted did not constitute a taking because it did 
not prevent any non·mining uses of land); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Ben· 
dictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987) (statute designed to prevent ground surface from col-
lapsing was warranted in interest of public safety). 
186. Mugler v. Kansas, 1923 U.S. 623, 661-62 (1887). See also Everard's Breweries 
v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 563 (1924) (law banning sale of certain beverages already existing 
at time ofact); Jacob Ruppert, Inc. v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 303 (1920) (same). 
187. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987). Although 
the Court found the interest advanced to be legitimate, it concluded that conditioning a 
building permit on the grant of a public easement to provide physical access to the 
beach did not satisfy the "essential nexus" requirement. [d. at 837. The Court has 
used this requirement where land development permits are conditioned on granting 
public easements, stating that in such cases there must be an "essential nexus" and a 
"rough proportionality" between the interest and the conditions· imposed by the regula-
tion. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994). When the regulation does 
not require a public easement on private property, the Court has not applied the essen-
tial nexus requirement. See Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578-79 (1995) 
(noting that "KEystone [480 U.S. at 4901-decided in the same year as Nollan-down-
played the need for any nexus requirement in considering the constitutionality of a 
general regulation and focused on the need for a legitimate police power justification"). 
188. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645. 
189. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-19 (emphasis added). 
190. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 643 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (approximately 75% diminution in value); Hadacheck, 239 
U.S. 394 (finding that a ban on brickyard plant operations was not a taking because it 
was intended to protect human health even when the ban reduced the value of plain-
tift's property from $2 million to $100,000 (92.5% diminution»). See also Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1019 n.8 ("It is true that in at least some cases the landowner with 95% loss will 
get nothing, while the landowner with total loss will recover in full."); Andrus, 444 U.S. 
at 66 (although the regulation prevented "the most profitable use of [claimant'sl prop-
erty," it did not prevent all use); Haas v. City & County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 
1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 1979) (diminution in value from $2 million to $100,000 not a tak-
41
Wagner: Environmental Expropriation
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
506 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 29:465 
It is important to note that the Court has repeatedly held 
that it must analyze the impact of a regulation on the property 
as a whole. "At least where an owner possesses a full 'bWldle' 
of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bWldle 
is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its 
entirety. "191 Thus, in Keystone, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that a regulation prohibiting the removal of more than 
50% of the coal beneath certain structures constituted a taking 
of the Wlremoved coal. 192 
The fmal factor identified by the Supreme Court in consid-
ering whether a regulation effects a compensable taking is the 
degree to which the regulation interferes with the claimant's 
"reasonable investment-backed expectations. "193 Thus, for ex-
ample, the owner of property used in an activity already sub-
ject to extensive regulation has no reasonable expectation that 
new or changed regulations will not affect the value of that 
property. 194 A property owner "necessarily expects the uses of 
ing). Even where a regulation has removed all economically beneficial use, the Court 
has refused to require compensation if the owner had no reasonable investment·backed 
expectation of being able to make that use of the property. See infra, text accompany· 
ing notes 193-196. 
191. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66. In Concrete Pipe, the Court stated: "To the extent 
that any portion of property is taken, that portion is always taken in its entirety; the 
relevant question, however, is whether the property taken is all, or only a portion of, 
the parcel in question." 508 U.S. at 644 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-32 ("[A) 
claimant's parcel of property [cannot] first be divided into what was .tak.en and what 
was left for the purpose of demonstrating the taking of the former to be complete and 
hence compensable")). 
192. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497-98 (1987). 
193. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645 (quotation omitted). This factor is sometimes 
considered as a threshold question regarding whether the property interest at issue 
ever included the right to use the property in the manner prohibited by the regula-
tion-ifthere is no such use interest, the regulation cannot be a taking. See, e.g., M&J 
Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1153·54 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court 
applied the test in this manner in Lucas. See 505 U.S. at 1034-35 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring) (characterizing majority's consideration of the "nature of the owner's estate" as 
a test of "whether the deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expec-
tations"). 
194. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645 ("[L]egislation readjusting rights and 
burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations ... even 
though the effect of the legislation is to impose a new duty or liability based on past 
acts"; "those who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative 
scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end" (quota-
tions omitted; citing numerous cases)); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1007, 1009 (pesticide 
sale and use is an area that "has long been the source of public concern and the subject 
of government regulation"; no reasonable expectation of confidentiality because the 
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his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various 
measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of 
its police powers."195 Moreover, it is reasonable for an investor 
to expect legislation that imposes an economic burden in the 
form of liability for past harm caused by the investor, "whether 
or not the cost was foreseen at the time" the harm was 
caused. 196 
Even a regulation prohibiting all economically beneficial use 
may not require compensation if "the logically antecedent in-
quiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the pro-
scribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with. "197 
In this respect, the Supreme Court has distinguished between 
personal and real property. Regarding personal property, the 
Court has stated that "by reason of the State's traditionally 
high degree of control over commercial dealings, [the property 
owner] ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation 
might even render his property economically worthless (at least 
chemical industry has historically been "a focus of great public concern and significant 
government regulation" such that there was a substantial possibility that the Federal 
Government "would find disclosure to be in the public interest."). 
195. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028. See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hemstead, 369 U.S. 
590, 593 (1962) ("A prohibition simply on the use of property for purposes that are 
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the 
community, cannot in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of prop-
erty for the public benefit."). 
196. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2153 (1998). In Eastern Enter-
prises, the Court held unconstitutional a law requiring a company to pay benefits to 
retired coal miners and their dependents, despite the fact that the company had not 
been in the coal business in approximately 30 years. A plurality opinion found the law 
to violate the Takings Clause because it "single[d) out certain employers to bear a bur-
den that is substantial in amount, based on the employers' conduct far in the past, and 
unrelated to any commitment that the employers made or to any injury they caused." 
[d. at 2153. The plurality distinguished the case from other cases, however, because 
the coal law was "not calibrated either to [the claimant's) past actions or to any agree-
ment-implicit or otherwise-by the company," id. at 2152 (citing Concrete Pipe and 
Connolly), and did not "merely impose liability for the effects of disabilities bred in the 
past [that) is justified as a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees' dis-
abilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor:" [d. (quoting Usury 
v. Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. I, 18 (1976)). The plurality further stated that the claim-
ant in Eastern Enterprises "might be responsible for employment-related health prob-
lems of all former employees whether or not the cost was foreseen at the time of em-
ployment," but noted that the law at issue did not make any such connection. [d. at 
2153. 
197. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. 
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if the property's only economically productive use is sale or 
manufacture for sale)."198 
Regarding regulations affecting land, the Court would re-
quire compensation when a regulation prohibits all economi-
cally beneficial use unless the regulation simply implemented a 
restriction that already existed in "the background principles of 
the State's law of property and nuisance."I99 Thus, for example, 
the Court stated that the owner of a lakebed could be denied a 
permit to engage in a landfilling operation that would cause 
flooding in others' land without the denial, giving rise to a right 
to compensation.2°O Nor would the corporate owner of a nuclear 
generating plant have a right to compensation if the state di-
rected it to "remove all facilities from its land upon discovery 
that the plant sits astride an earthquake fault. "201 This special 
requirement is probably limited to land-use regulations that 
prohibit all economically beneficial use. In light of the Court's 
consideration of the economic impact of the regulation, 202 
whether a regulation affecting land implements a preexisting 
198. [d. at 1027·28. 
199. [d. at 1029. "A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no 
more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts-by adja. 
cent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private 
nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect 
the public generally, or otherwise." [d. 
200. [d. at 1030. 
201. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030. The Court explained that: 
such regulatory action may well have the effect of eliminating the land's only 
economically productive use, but it does not proscribe a productive use that 
was previously permissible under relevant property and nuisance principles. 
The use of these properties for what are now expressly prohibited purposes 
was always unlawful, and (subject to other constitutional limitations) it was 
open to the State at any point to make the implication of those background 
principles of nuisan~e and property law explicit. 
[d. at 1029·30. A federal court of appeals directly addressed the Supreme Court's sec· 
ond hypothetical. rejecting a compensation claim based on the government's failure to 
issue an operating permit for a plutonium recycling plant, even though the government 
had actively promoted and induced the claimant's expenditure of over $200 million to 
build the plant and had led the claimant to expect the permit before changing course 
and denying the permit. Allied-General Nuclear Services v. United States .. 839 F.2d 
1572 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.s. 819 (1988). The court explained that "the basic 
rule that is dispositive here is that as against reasonable state regulation, no one has a 
legally protected right to use property in a manner that is injurious to the safety of the 
general public." [d. at 1576. 
202. See supra notes 188-192 and accompanying text. 
44
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss3/6
1999] ENVIRONMENTAL EXPROPRIATION 509 
regulation should be less important if the regulation leaves 
some economically beneficial use of the property. 203 
Applying the analysis required by the Supreme Court, lower 
courts of the United States have rejected compensation claims 
arising out of a wide range of laws protecting the environment 
or human health, including, among many others, laws requir-
ing the clean-up of harmful commercial byproducts204 or other 
hazardous materials/05 limiting harmful air emissions;206 re-
stricting the sale and transport of endangered species;207 re-
stricting the right to hunt particular animals on private land;208 
requiring the destruction of abandoned buildings;209 and pro-
hibiting the exploitation of natural resources on private prop-
erty for reasons of public health, safety and welfare. 210 
203. As Justice Kennedy stated in his concurring opinion in Lucas: 
the State should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in 
response to changing conditions, and courts must consider all reasonable ex-
pectations whatever their source.... Coastal property may present such 
unique concerns for a fragile land system that the State can go further in 
regulating its development and use than the common law of nuisance might 
otherwise permit. 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Cf Miller, 276 U.S. at 280 (in con-
sidering due process challenge to order requiring destruction of diseased trees, Court 
"need not weigh with nicety the question whether the infected cedars constitute a nui-
sance according to the common law; or whether they may be so declared by statute. 
For where, as here, the choice is unavoidable, we cannot say that its exercise, con-
trolled by considerations of social policy which are not unreasonable, involves any 
denial of due process"). 
204. See, e.g., Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (law re-
quiring uranium producers to clean up hazardous mill tailings not require compensa-
tion, even though the cleanup cost will be greater than the value of the mill and the 
government had encouraged the companies to produce the uranium). 
205. See, e.g., Kaufman v. City of New York, 717 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (law 
requiring removal of asbestos from office buildings not a taking, despite fact that city 
had previously approved asbestos for fireproofing); United States v. Northeastern 
Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) (rejecting takings claim based on retroac-
tive application of US Superfund law requiring claimant to pay cleanup costs). 
206. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1139-40 (D.C. Cir. 1976), vacated 
and remanded for reconsideration in light of subsequent legislation, 434 U.S. 809 
(1977). 
207. See, e.g., United States v. Kepler, 531 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1976). 
208. See, e.g., Clajon, 70 F.3d at 1566 (lOth Cir. 1995) (limiting hunting licenses to 
two per landowner, regardless of size of property, not a taking). 
209. See, e.g., Hoeck v. City of Portland, 57 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995). 
210. See, e.g., MacLeod v. County of Santa Clara, 749 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984) (de-
nial of timber harvest permit does not deny all economically viable use of property, 
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2. Regulatory Takings Under Canadian Law 
Canadian courts have generally refused to require compen-
sation for the loss of property value caused by a legitimate gov-
ernment regulation unless the regulation actually transfers a 
benefit from the original owner to the government.211 This 
treatment arises out of the Canadian constitutional regime, 
pursuant to which 
the provisional Legislatures ... probably have a general 
power to expropriate property in the province, simply by 
virtue of their legislative power over "property and civil 
rights in the province." The constitutional changes of 
1982 put important restraints on the freedom of action 
of both the federal and provisional governments in the 
field of civil rights. But, they did not impose rights 
comparable to those of American constitutional law in 
favour of the owners of property. The Canadian Charter 
of Rights, section 7, assures that "everyone has the right 
to life, liberty and security of the person ... ," but it does 
not go on, as do the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution with respect to the 
powers of Congress or the States, to assure the light to 
"property.'J212 
despite claim that harvest is only profitable use); SUCN Suarez v. Gelabert, 541 F. 
Supp. 1253 (D. Puerto Rico 1982) (denial of sand extraction permit not a taking). 
211. See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF CANADA 28-10 (1997) ("Where a 
statute is regulatory, not involving a taking of property, the general rule is that no 
compensation is payable for loss caused by the statute."). See also Michelle Swenar-
chuk, Stomping on the Earth: Trade, Trade Law, and Canada's Ecological Footprints, 
BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 197, 211 (1998) ("Canadian law maintains the principle that legisla-
tures may legitimately regulate property use in the public interest, without having to 
pay compensation if the measures are undertaken in good faith and do not involve a 
change in title."). 
212. Donald S. Macdonald, Sovereignty Revisited: Chapter 11 of NAFTA- What Are 
the Implications for Sovereignty?, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 281, 282 (1998) (quoting PETER W. 
HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF CANADA 396 (Carwell, Toronto, 2d ed. 1995) (citing 
Canadian Constitution § 92(13»; Constitution Act of 1982, Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms § 7). See also A&L Investments Ltd. v. Ontario, [1997) D.L.RAth 692, 
702 ("[T)he jurisprudence that has developed under the Charter [of Rights and Free-
doms) has made clear that economic rights as generally encompassed by the term 
'property' and the economic right to carryon a business, to earn a particular livelihood, 
or to engage in a particular professional activity all fall outside the s. 7 guarantee." 
46
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss3/6
1999] ENVIRONMENTAL EXPROPRIATION 511 
Under this scheme, "an aggrieved landowner must be able 
to demonstrate that not only has property been taken, but that 
the taking has also benefited the expropriating authority."213 
In a recent case applying this principle, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal considered a claim that a law voiding previously-issued 
government orders permitting landlords to increase rents con-
stituted a taking of the landlords' property rights. 214 The court 
first noted that Canadian law applies a presumption pursuant 
to which "unless the words of the statute clearly so demand, a 
statute is not to be construed so as to take away the property of 
a subject without compensation. "215 After reviewing several 
cases, the court concluded that "for the presumption of com-
pensation to apply, ... the legislation must create what is in 
essence an expropriation of the plaintiffs property by the state. 
The state must acquire the property taken from the plaintiff 
either for its own use or for the purpose of destruction. "216 Re-
garding the claim before it, the court denied the compensation 
claim, holding that, 
[w]hile the property rights of the plaintiffs voided by the 
[law] may, in one sense, be said to have been taken from 
the plaintiffs, in no sense can they be said to have been 
acquired by the Crown .... 
The [law] is not an act of expropriation by the Crown. 
Rather, it is an exercise of its regulatory authority. 
(Citations omitted». HOGG, supra note 211, at 28-11 ("In Canada, ... neither the Con-
stitution Act, 1867 nor the Charter of Rights contains any guarantee of compensation 
and, in the absence of any such guarantee, legislative power is unlimited. The position 
was accurately, if dramatically, put by the judge who said that 'the prohibition "Thou 
shalt not steal" has no force upon the sovereign body.'" (Citations and quotation omit-
ted.». 
213. Swenarchuk, supra note 211, at 208; see also id. (Under Canadian law "the 
term 'expropriation' traditionally refers to a landowner's loss of use, title or benefit of 
property and a transfer of the value of use, title or benefit to a public authority."); See 
also Queen in Right of British Columbia v. Tener [1985]17 D.L.RAth 1,6 ("Expropria-
tion or compulsory taking occurs if the Crown or a public authority acquires from the 
owner an interest in property"). See also A&L Investments, 152 D.L.R.4th 692. 
214. A&L Investments, 152 D.L.RAth at 695-696. 
215. Id. at 698-699 (quotation omitted). 
216. Id. at 700 (citing Steer Holdings Ltd. v. Government of Manitoba [1993] 2 
W.W.R. 146 (Man. C.A.); Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel [1920] A.C. 508; 
Burma Oil Co. Ltd. v. Lord Advocate [1965] A.C. 75 (H.L.». 
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There is no principle of statutory interpretation that 
would presume that those adversely affected by a stat-
ute regulating their affairs are entitled to compensation 
unless the statute says otherwise. No policy basis is 
readily apparent for such a rule. Indeed, such a princi-
ple would severely hamper the operation of the modem 
state where most regulatory legislation, however reme-
dial, adversely affects someone. Moreover, if regulatory 
legislation voiding but not expropriating property rights 
triggered a presumed right to compensation from the 
state, the effect would be to give property rights the 
equivalent of the protection accorded by s. 7 of the Char-
ter despite the clear exclusion of such rights from the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms by its drafters. In 
other words, an individual would have the right not to 
be deprived of his property by regulatory legislation ex-
cept with compensation or with an explicit override of 
that right by legislative language. 217 
Canadian courts have applied these principles to uphold 
regulations even when the regulations have prohibited all ef-
fective use of the property in question. For example, in Hartel 
Holdings Co. Ltd. v. Council of the City of Calgary, the Su-
preme Court of Canada refused to require compensation when 
a law freezing development had removed all economically vi-
able use of the claimant's land.218 Because the city's actions 
were "taken pursuant to a legitimate and valid planning pur-
pose, ... the resulting detriment' to the appellant is one that 
217. [d. at 701. The Supreme Court of Canada has suggested that the requirement 
of transfer to the government removes most regulatory actions from the category of 
expropriation requiring compensation. In Tener, 17 D.L.R.4th at 12, described infra 
text accompanying note8 222 - 226, the Court distinguished zoning regulations and the 
regulation of activities on lands, which "add nothing to the value of public property," 
from takings that enhance the value of government assets. 
On the other hand, when a regulation does transfer the property in question to the 
government, Canadian courts have not hesitated to require compensation. For exam-
ple, in Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. The Queen [1975] 88 D.L.R.3d 462, the Supreme 
Court of Canada upheld a compensation claim brought by the owner of' a fish market-
ing corporation that had been put out of business when a Canadian law gave a monop-
oly in fish marketing to a government corporation. The Court based its conclusion on 
the fact that the law had transferred the claimant's business to the government. [d. at 
469-71. 
218. [1984] 8 D.L.R.4th 321. 
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must be endured in the public interest."219 Similarly, in La 
Ferme Filiber Ltee v. The Queen,220 the court refused to require 
compensation to a claimant who was forced to shut down his 
trout-hatching enterprise, for which he had held an operating 
license for five years, because of a law prohibiting the operation 
of such hatcheries in the area.221 The court's decision was 
based on the fact that, although the claimant's rights were ex-
tinguished, the regulation had not transferred any property 
interest to the government.222 . 
Some Canadian cases have also distinguished between real 
and personal property, generally giving broad leeway to the 
government to regulate without incurring an obligation to 
compensate for the effects of the regulation on the value of per-
sonal property.223 This distinction is clear in two cases consid-
219. [d. at 334. See also Soo Mill & Lumber Co. v. City of Sault Ste-Marie [1975] 2 
Can. S.C.R. 78, 83 (upholding zoning regulation that "sterilized [the claimant's land] in 
respect of any effective use," because development freezes not prohibited if enacted in 
accordance with the purpose of municipal plans or zoning regulations); Sanbay Devel-
opments Ltd. v. City of London [1975] 45 D.L.R.3d 403 (refusing to invalidate zoning 
regulation that froze development of claimant's land). Scholars have stated that the 
principle underlying Soo Mill, Sanbay and Hartel Holdings is that "planning authori-
ties may regulate, restrict or prohibit land use or development without triggering the 
remedy of compensation for affected landowners, providing that such measures are 
undertaken in good faith for a proper planning purpose." RICHARD LINDGREN & KAREN 
CLARK, PROPERTY RIGHTS VS. LAND USE REGULATION: DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF 
"EXPROPRIATION WITHOUT COMPENSATION" 5-8 (Canadian Envtl. L. Ass'n 1994) (quoted 
in Swenarchuk, supra note 211, at 210-11). See also Swenarchuk, supra note 211, at 
208-09 ("Canadian courts have long recognized that land use regulation is not "expro-
priation," primarily because zoning by-laws [regulations] or other planning instru-
ments do not generally involve a taking or transfer of the full use, title or benefit of 
property. Therefore, if a landowner's ability to use or develop his or her property is 
constrained by a properly enacted zoning by-law, the landowner is not entitled to com-
pensation, even if the zoning by-law causes a diminution in property value."). 
220. [1997]1 F.C. 128. 
221. [d. at 128-29. 
222. [d. at 130 ("An expropriation implies dispossession of the expropriated party 
and appropriation by the expropriating party; it net:essarily requires a transfer of 
property or rights from one party to the other. There is nothing of that kind here. 
Defendant has not acquired anything belonging to plaintiff."). 
223. See Swenarchuk, supra note 211, at 208 ("In Canada, the issue of expropria-
tion generally arises in relation to real estate, not other forms of property"). The dis-
tinction between real and personal property has not been absolute. For example, in 
Manitoba Fisheries v. The Queen [1978] 1 S.C.R. 101, the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that the owner of a pre-existing private fish exporting business had a right to 
compensation for loss of the business's goodwill after a federal statute put him out of 
business by giving a government corporation the exclusive right to export fish. 
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ering compensation claims arising out of the loss of property 
resulting from laws designating certain land as public parks. 224 
In each case, the claimant held rights related to the exploita-
tion of subsurface minerals within the designated land and the. 
designation prohibited mineral exploration and extraction. 225 
In Queen in Right of British Columbia v. Tener, the Supreme 
Court of Canada held that the claimant was entitled to com-
pensation, relying on the fact that the property taken by the 
regulation, which included the right of access to the claim area, 
was a real property interest. 226 In Cream Silver Mines Ltd. v. 
British Columbia, however, the court refused to follow the Te-
ner decision and denied compensation, stating that although 
the claimant's mining claim was rendered useless, it; was "ma-
terial" that the interest at issue was not an interest in land. 227 
3. Regulatory Takings Under Mexican Law 
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution provides: 
Ownership of the lands and waters within the 
boundaries of the national territory is vested originally 
in the Nation, which has had, and has, the right to 
transmit title thereof to private persons, thereby consti-
tuting private property. 
Private property shall not be expropriated except for 
reasons of public use and subject to payment of indem-
nity. 
224. Tener, 17 D.L.R.4th at 5; Cream Silver Mines Ltd. v. British Columbia [1993) 
99 D.L.R.4th 199, 205. 
225. Tener, 17 D.L.R.4th at 3, 5; Cream Silver Mines, 99 D.L.R.4th at 205. 
226. Tener, 17 D.L.R.4th at 3 (claimant's grant entitled it to "all [subsurface) min-
erals ... and the right to the use and possession of the surface of such mineral claim ... 
for the purpose of winning and getting from and out of such claim the minerals con-
tained therein"). See also id. at 6 (grant was interest in land). The Court also noted 
that the denial of access to the park lands enhanced the value of the government's 
asset (the park). See id. at 12. 
227. Cream Silver, 99 D.L.R.4th at 202, 205-206 (as opposed to the Crown grant at 
issue in Tener, this is simply a mineral claim; there has never been any absolute right 
of access to the claim area to obtain the ore, the government has power to refuse to 
grant right of way, and such claims "have never been capable of registration under the 
... system ofland regulation"). 
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The Nation shall at all times have the right to impose 
on private property rights the limitations dictated by 
the public interest, as well as to regulate, for the collec-
tive good, the use of natural resources susceptible to ap-
propriation, to ensure a more equitable distribution of 
public wealth, to conserve them, to achieve the well-
balanced development of the country and the improve-
ment of the living conditions of the rural and urban 
population.228 . 
This provision clearly distinguishes between expropriation 
-which, under Mexican law, consists of "legally taking a thing 
from its owner, for reasons of public utility, and giving the 
owner a fair indemnification"229-and the limitations (modali-
dades) referred to in the third paragraph, which do not require 
indemnification even though they may affect the value of prop-
erty.230 The Mexican Supreme Court of Justice has explained 
228. Const. of Mexico, Tit. I, Chap. I, art. 27, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES 
OF THE WORLD (Apr. 1988 & Supp. June 1998). 
The Constitution also conditions the right of foreigners to own "lands, waters, and 
their appurtenances, or to obtain concessions for the exploitation of mines or waters" 
on the foreigners' agreement that they will ·consider themselves as nationals in respect 
to such property and bind themselves not to invoke the protection of their governments 
in matters relating thereto; under penalty, in case of noncompliance with this agree-
ment, of forfeiture of the acquired property to the Nation." Id., art. 27.1 (Supp. June 
1998). This provision is a codification of the "Calvo Doctrine" regarding expropriation, 
which is followed by most Latin American nations. See Justine Daly, Has Mexico 
Crossed the &rder on State Responsibility for Economic Injury to Aliens? Foreign In-
vestment and the Calvo Clause in Mexico After NAFTA, 25 ST. MARY L.J. 1147, 1150, 
1163-65 (1994). The United States has consistently rejected the Calvo Doctrine as a 
basis for the treatment offoreign investment. See id. at 1166-71. 
229. JUAN JOSE GoNzALEZ MARQUEZ, NUEVO DERECHO AMBIENTAL MEXICANO 
(INSTRUMENTOS DE POLiTICA) 154 (Universidad Aut6noma Metropolitana 1997) 
(translations by author) (quoting Monique Lions, Expropiaci6n, in Instituto de Investi-
gaciones Jur£dicos, DICCIONARIO Jurumco MEXICANO 1389 (Mexico, POrrUa-UNAM 
1992). See also GABINO FRAGA, DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO 375-76 (Mexico 1984) 
(translations by author) ("in the case of expropriation an individual is deprived of his or 
her goods inasmuch as this is necessary for the state"). 
230. See FRAGA, supra note 229, at 375-76 ("Expropriation for reasons of public 
value is to be distinguished from the limitations that the State may impose on private 
property for reasons of public interest (Art. 27, para. III, Federal Const.)). In the words 
of one Mexican legal scholar, 
[t]he right to property [under the Mexican Constitution] is not an absolute 
right, but is a right that serves a social function, and therefore, in Article 27 ... 
the Nation is empowered to limit the exercise of that right. [Article 27] signi-
fies that private property is of a derivative character and as a result the nation 
may impose limitations on it. 
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that these latter limitations constitute "a partial extinction of 
the rights of the owner," whereas 
expropriation amounts to the substitution of the right to 
use and ownership of the thing for the enjoyment of the 
indemnity. Regarding the former llimitations], the sup-
pression of the partial authority of the owner occurs 
without any consideration; regarding the latter, the 
damage caused is compensated through the payment of 
the value of the rights lost.23\ 
Limitations that do not require indemnification must be 
generally applicable, rather than specifically directed at an 
identified piece of property, and must remove only limited at-
tributes of the owner's right to the property, rather than trans-
ferring to the State ownership of the property. 232 Using these 
criteria, the Mexican Supreme Court has not required indemni-
fication for the effects of regulations prohibiting a general cate-
gory of activities in certain types of locations, such as regula-
tions prohibiting the construction of ovens, chimneys or certain 
other potentially hazardous structures less than a prescribed 
distance from the property of another.233 Another example of 
property limitations that do not require indemnification are 
decrees, issued pursuant to the General Law of Ecological Bal-
ance, limiting the use of property within natural protected ar-
GoNzALEZ MARQUEZ, supra note 229, at 152-53. 
231. [Supreme Court of Justice Report] 1980, Pleno tesis 29, at 543 (quoted in 
FRAGA, supra note 229, at 376-77). 
232. Gonzalez Marquez, supra 228, at 156-58 (citing Mexican Supreme Court of 
Justice, Septima Epoca, Primera Parte: Volumenes 133-38, 155. Amparo en revisi6n 
6408nS. Maria Fortes de Lamas, 18 Mar. 1980). See also Supreme Court of Justice 
Report 1980, supra note 231 (limitations "suppose a general and permanent restriction 
on the property right; [expropriation] implies the transfer of the rights over a specific 
good through the intervention of the state"); FRAGA, supra note 229, at 375-76 
("[T]here are differences of form and substance between limitations and expropriation. 
The former is a measure of general and abstract character that is part of and shapes, 
but does not transform, the legal regime regarding the general ownership of property 
in a given time and place. Expropriation, on the other hand, constitutes a measure of 
individual and specific character whose effects are concentrated on a specific prop-
erty."). 
233. GoNzALEZ MARQUEZ, supra note 229, at 165-66 (citing unanimous decision of 
Mexican Supreme Court of Justice, Tomo CXL, at 1918. Amparo civil en revisi6n 
943148. Diaz de Garza Consuelo, 14 Mar. 1952). 
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eas.234 Because these regulations do not remove all of the 
owner's rights in the property, and are of general application, 
they do not require compensation. 
B. INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 
International law addresses the takings issue under the ru-
bric of "expropriation" - which is "a compulsory transfer of 
property rights"235 - and refers to regulatory takings as "indi-
rect expropriation," "disguised expropriation" or "creeping ex-
propriation. "236 Although a government must generally provide 
compensation for expropriation,237 it is "an accepted principle of 
international law that a State is not liable for economic injury 
which is a consequence of bona fide 'regulation' within the ac-
cepted police power of states. »238 Thus, "anti-trust, consumer 
protection, securities, environmental protection, land planning 
and other legislation, are non-compensable takings. These 
234. ld. at 161·62. 
235. Amoco Int'l Fin. v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 27 LL.M. 1320, 
1342·43 (1988). The "paradigm" of direct expropriation consists of "an involuntary 
transfer of ownership effected immediately by legislation in pursuance of state policy. 
This results in the vesting of ownership of the property in the state or a state entity 
created to run the industry that is taken over and the destruction of the rights of own-
ership of the foreign investors in the industry." SORNARAJAH, supra note 159, at 282. 
236. SORNARAJAH, supra note 159, at 282. One scholar rejects the phrase "creeping 
expropriation" for fear that it "suggests a deliberate strategy on the part of the state, 
which may imply a negative moral judgment." RudolfDolzer,lndirect Expropriation of 
Alien Property, 1 ICSID REVIEW, FOREIGN INV. L.J. 41, 44 (1986). 
237. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 
712. 
238. Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., Interlocutory Award 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. 
Trib. Rep. 248, 275 (1985). The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States § 712, cmt. g, states that a State need not provide compensation for 
loss of property or for other economic disadvantage resulting from bona fide 
general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other action of the kind 
that is commonly accepted as within the police power of states, if it is not dis-
criminatory and is not designed to cause the alien to abandon the property to 
the state or sell it at a distress price. 
See also id. at reporter's note 6 ("It is often necessary to determine ... whether an ac-
tion by a state constitutes a taking and requires compensation under international law, 
or is a police power regulation or tax that does not give rise to an obligation to compen-
sate even though a foreign national suffers loss as a consequence."); SORNARAJAH, 
supra note 159, at 299 (1994) ("Obviously, infringements of property rights in control-
ling hazardous or environmentally sound use of property ... are regulatory takings that 
require no compensation"; "It cannot be claimed by the citizens of these states that 
compensation is due to them when there is such regulatory intervention."). 
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regulations are regarded as essential to the efficient function-
ing of the state."239 
Legal scholars have long affIrmed this principle. 240 The evi-
dence supporting these scholarly pronouncements has gener-
ally consisted of the decisions of international courts and tri-
bunals that have decided claims of expropriation. Although 
international law generally recognizes judicial decisions as a 
subsidiary source of internationallaw,241 and the principles of 
239. SORNARAJAH, supra note 159, at 283. 
240. See, e.g., G.C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under Interna· 
tional Law, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 307, 331·32 (1962) ("[T)he operation of a State's tax 
laws, changes in the value of a State's currency, actions in the interest of the public 
health and morality, will all serve to justifY [i.e., remove from the category of expro-
priatory or compensable acts) actions which because of their severity would not other-
wise be justifiable; subject to the proviso, of course, that the action in question is not 
what would be commonly called discriminatory [with respect to aliens)."); S. FRIEDMAN, 
EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 1 (1953) ("Indirect expropriation resulting from 
the normal functioning of public services would not appear to give rise to any great 
difficulty from the point of view of international law ."). See also, SORNARAJAH, supra 
note 159, at 282-83 ("all measures affecting property rights" would not be an acceptable 
definition of taking in international law "for the simple reason that normal activities of 
states, such as taxation, affect property rights and cannot be expected to give rise to 
international concern."); id. at 303 ("[T)he generally accepted view is that the exercise 
of [the power to increase taxation) cannot be regarded as a taking in violation of prop-
erty rights."). 
241. As with any norm of international law, principles concerning expropriation de-
rive from three primary sources. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
June 26, 1945, art. 38, para. 1, 59 Stat. 1033, 1060. The most authoritative sources of 
in~ernational legal obligations for a particular nation are found in international 
agreements to which that nation is a party and customary international law, which 
reflects state practice grounded in a belief that the practice is required by law. See id; 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, §§ 102(1)-(4), 
103(2) (1987). As noted above, note 22 and accompanying text, international agree-
ments addressing indirect expropriation seldom define precisely what it is or when it 
gives rise to an obligation to provide compensation. One U.S. government official has 
stated that international investment agreements "do not generally call into question 
the sovereign right of governments to regulate as long as regulation does not single out 
or discriminate against investors based on their nationality." Larson Testimony, supra 
note 15. 
A secondary source of international law are "general principles oflaw common to the 
countries of the world." ICJ Statute, supra, para. 1.d. In this regard, it is worth noting 
that the constitutions of 19 nations make clear that governmental measures that affect 
the value of property will not be considered compensable takings where those measures 
are intended to protect human, animal or plant health, or (regarding taking of land) to 
conserve soil or other natural resources. See CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE 
WORLD (Apr. 1997 & Supps.) (constitutions of Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barba-
dos, Belize, Botswana, Dominica, Gambia, Grenada, Jamaica, Kenya, Malta, Mauri-
tius, Papa New Guinea, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Tuvalu, Zambia, Zimbabwe). Such provisions, along with the consis-
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stare decisis does not formally apply to international 
tribunals,242 the general lack of more authoritative sources ad-
dressing the limits of indirect expropriation gives such deci-
sions a special legitimacy. 243 
One of the most prolific interpreters of the international law 
of expropriation has been the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, which 
was established in 1981 to adjudicate claims by nationals of 
each country against the government of the other. 244 In re-
viewing the Tribunal's decisions until 1994, one member of the 
tent practice of national courts, which, with the exception of US, Canadian and Mexi-
can practice, is beyond the scope of this Article, support the conclusion that interna-
tional law does not require compensation for the economic effects of environmental 
regulations. 
Judicial decisions and the writings of scholars serve as "subsidiary means for the de-
termination of rules oflaw." ICJ Statute, supra, para. l.d. 
242. For example, the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides: "The 
decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of 
that particular case." ICJ Statute, supra note 241, art. 59. 
243. Modem tribunals deciding expropriation claims have "placed their principal 
reliance on judicial and arbitral precedents." Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future 
or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 
AM. J. INT'L L. 474, 498 (1991). Norton notes several reasons for this phenomenon, 
including a "natural predisposition of arbitrators toward the approach of their prede-
cessors" and the legitimacy provided when a case is decided consistently with previous 
analogous cases. Id. at 498-99. Moreover, in the absence of a clear international 
statement or applicable treaty resolving the question, "such precedents have a ten-
dency to coalesce into a source oflegitimacy." Id. at 500. . 
244. Declarations of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Al-
geria Concerning Commitments and Settlement of Claims by the United States and 
Iran with respect to Resolution of the Crisis arising out of the Detention of 52 United 
States Nationals in Iran, with Undertakings and Escrow Agreement, Jan. 19, 1981, 
T.I.A.S. (entered into force Jan. 19, 1981). Although the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
primarily applies the Treaty of Amity between Iran and the United States, Treaty of 
Amity .. Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, 284 U.N.T.S. 93 (en-
tered into force June 16, 1957), 
lilt is beyond doubt that international law has been the applicable law in cases 
where expropriation has been an issue before the Tribunal. ... Nevertheless, as 
regards the questions of expropriation ... there is no indication that the Tribu-
nal conceives the Treaty standards to differ from standards of customary in-
ternationallaw. Rather, ... the Tribunal has emphasized, for example, that 
the Treaty does not add anything to the general rules of international law in-
sofar as concerns the concept of a taking. 
Matti Pellonpaa, Compensable Claims Before the Tribunal: Expropriation Claims, 
in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAw OF 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 186-87 (Richard B. Lillich & Daniel Barstow Magraw eds., 
1997) (citations omitted). See also Sedco, Inc., 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 273 
("[Tlhe Treaty of Amity on the particular issue of what constitutes a taking incor-
porates the rules of customary intemationallaw. "). 
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Tribunal, George Aldrich, described the Tribunal's under-
standing that, under international law, "[l]iability does not 
arise from actions that are nondiscriminatory and are within 
the commonly accepted taxation and police powers of states. "245 
Numerous other tribunals have reached the same conclusion. 246 
International tribunals have seldom, if ever, addressed 
whether environmental regulations affecting foreign-owned 
property give rise to a right to compensation. However, an ex-
amination of cases addressing indirect expropriation claims 
arising out of regulations promoting other government inter-
ests demonstrates that international law would not support an 
expropriation claim arising out of legitimate environmental 
regulations. 
International tribunals have not agreed on a definitive test 
establishing when indirect expropriation gives rise to a right to 
compensation. Although these tribunals have not agreed to a 
list of factors relevant to the question, they frequently refer to 
factors similar to those described by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
For example, international tribunals have considered 
whether government actions leading to indirect expropriation 
are "reasonable."247 In one such case, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tri-
245. George H. Aldrich, What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The 
Decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 585, 609 (1994) 
[hereinafter Aldrich II. See also GEORGE H. ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 217 (1996) (same) [hereinafter ALDRICH Ill. 
See, e.g., Sedco, Inc., 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.; Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance As-
socs., 23 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 378 (1989). 
246. See, e.g., Kugele v. Polish State, 6 Ann. Dig. Int'l L. 69 (1931-a2) (Upper Sile-
sian Arb. Trib. 1930) (series oflicense fees that forced claimant to close brewery did not 
constitute compensable taking); Brewer, Moller & Co. Case (Ger. v. Ven.), 10 R. Int'l 
Arb. Awards 423 (1903) (taxes legally levied and without discrimination cannot be 
recovered); Liselotte Hauer v. Land Reinland-Pflaz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727 (considering, 
inter alia, "principles of international law," finding no expropriation when EEC regula-
tions prohibited claimant from planting a certain type of grapevine because the regula-
tions promoted the general welfare). See also West v. Multibanco ComElrmex, S.A., 807 
F.2d 820, 831 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987) ([Ulnder international 
law, "[vlalid expropriations must always serve a public purpose; that public purpose in 
some cases may be so strong as to render lawful what otherwise might constitute a 
'taking'"; rmding no taking because requiring foreign funds to be surrendered in ex-
change for local (less valuable) fund was a legitimate exercise of the police power.). 
247. See supra notes 163-170 and accompanying text. 
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bunal considered an expropriation claim arising out of the re-
fusal of a government bank to honor the claimant's checks be-
cause of a law establishing certain authentication require-
ments.248 The Tribunal refused to find an expropriation be-
cause it did not find the bank's actions to amount to «unrea-
sonable interference" with the claimant's property. 249 Other 
cases have concluded that government regulations were rea-
sonable when they imposed taxes,250 prohibited planting new 
grapes to regulate wine production,251 and regulated the pro-
duction of alcohol through license fees. 252 
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, international law requires 
something more than a simple governmental declaration that a 
particular interference with an alien's enjoyment of his or her 
248. Harza Engineering Co. v. Iran, 1 Iran-U.s. Cl. Trib. Rep. 499, 504 (1981-82). 
Because of its finding, the Tribunal found it unnecessary to determine "how unreason-
able the interference must be to constitute a taking of property." [d. 
249. [d. at 505. See also Mark Dallal v. Iran, Award No. 53-149-1 (10 June 1983), 
reprinted in 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 10 (refusing compensation for bank's refusal to 
honor checks because no indication that banks had acted unreasonably). These deci-
sions follow general international legal practice, which considers financial regulation to 
be among the legitimate police powers of government. See Pellonpaa, supra note 244, 
at 253 (noting that the Iran-US Claims Tribunal's treatment of cases involving finan-
cial regulations "has not been decisively different" from "previous international legal 
practice, [in which) exchange control regulations and other restrictions on the transfer 
of funds abroad have been accepted to a very significant degree"). 
250. See Too, 23 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 387 (refusing to require compensation 
for government seizure of claimant's liquor license for failure to pay taxes due because 
"a State is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic disadvantage re-
sulting from bona fide general taxation or any other action that is commonly accepted 
as within the police power of States, provided it is not discriminatory and is not de-
signed to cause the alien to abandon the property to the State· or to sell it at a distress 
price."); Brewer, Moller & Co., 10 R. Int'! Arb. Awards at 423 (taxes legally levied and 
without discrimination cannot be recovered). 
251. Hauer, 1979 E.C.R. at 3745-49. Although the court in Hauer applied Euro-
pean law, the relevant protection of property rights depends on principles of interna-
tionallaw. See id. at 3745 (applying Article I of Protocol to European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights, which protects property rights "subject to the condi-
tions provided for ... by the general principles of intemationallaw"). 
252. See, e.g., Kugele, 6 Ann. Dig. at 69 (series of license fees that forced claimant to 
cloSe brewery did not constitute compensable taking). In Kugele, the tribunal stated 
that 
there is an essential difference between the maintenance of a certain rate of 
profit in an undertaking and the legal and factual possibility of continuing the 
undertaking. The trader may feel compelled to close his business because of 
the new tax .... But this does not mean that he has lost the right to engage in 
the trade. . 
Id. at 69 (citing 3 SCHIDSGERICHT FOR OBERSCHLESIEN at 24). 
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property is justified by the so-called 'police power,' "[b]ut, if the 
reasons given are valid and bear some plausible relationship to 
the action taken, no attempt may be made to search deeper to 
see whether the State was activated by some illicit motive."253 
Thus, the European Court of Justice considered "whether there 
exists a reasonable relationship between the measures pro-
vided for by the regulation [a prohibition on planting new 
grapes] and the aim pursued by the Community in this case [to 
regulate wine production]."254 
International decisions also recognize that the severity of 
the economic impact caused by an indirect expropriation is 
relevant to determining whether compensation is required. 255 
International tribunals have refused to require compensation 
when the expropriation did not remove all economic value from 
the property. As explained by one scholar considering the ju-
risprudence of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 
before measures restricting the rights of owners to use 
and dispose of their property will be considered to 
amount to expropriation it must be apparent that the 
governmental actions have so completely deprived the 
owners of their property rights that the rights are ren-
dered nugatory. Such fmdings are more readily made 
where the government has the avowed intention of so-
cialising the economy and thereby depriving private 
owners of their property rights. * * * [T]he principal 
test as to whether actions falling short of a forDlal tak-
ing of title constitute a taking is whether or not the ac-
tion fundamentally restricts the right of the owner to 
253. Christie, supra note 240, at 338. 
254. Hauer, 1979 E.C.R. at 3747. 
255. This principle may be a "general principle of law," recognized as a source of in-
ternational law. See supra note 241. One scholar reviewing "representative" legal 
systems concluded that 
a comparison of domestic law leaves no doubt that the prohibition of economi-
cally optimal use of property in itself may not be equated with an indirect ex-
propriation .... A survey of the relevant domestic laws indicates that [the point 
at which the regulation of property assumes the quality of an indirect expro-
priation] lies where the property in question, after introduction of the measure 
concerned, can no longer be put to reasonable economic use. 
Dolzer, supra note 236, at 62. 
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manage or dispose of the property, or if the property has 
been rendered virtually valueless. Governmental ac-
tions which limit the owner's right in relation to his 
property but which do not significantly affect the afore-
mentioned fundamental rights generally do not amount 
to expropriation of the property entitling the owner to 
compensation. 256 
This principle has been applied by the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal to decide an expropriation claim arising out of Iranian 
exchange restrictions that prohibited the Iranian Central Bank 
from converting claimant's money into a currency that could be 
transferred out of the country.257 When the claimant sought 
compensation, the Tribunal concluded that Iran had not expro-
priated the funds, because the "account remain[ed] in existence 
and available, in [Iranian currency], at [the claimant's] dis-
posal. n258 Similarly, the Tribunal refused to fmd an expropria-
tion when Iranian law prohibited the exportation of certain 
property but the claimant maintained the option to sell the 
property in Iran. 259 
256. WAYNE MAPP, THE IRAN·US CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: THE FIRST 10 YEARS 152, 155 
(1993). In Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 122, 154 (1983), 
the Tribunal stated: . 
[I)t is recognized in international law that measures taken by a State can in-
terfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so 
useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated, even though the 
State does not purpose to have expropriated them and the legal title to the 
property formally remains with the original owner. 
257. See Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Iran, 6 Cl. Trib. Rep. 149 (1984-II) cited in Pel-
lonpaa, supra note 244, at 253. 
25S. Id; at 167 (citing Harza Engineering Co., 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 499, in 
which "the Tribunal held that the refusal of [the bank) to honour four cheques drawn 
on the Claimant's account could have been motivated by reasons of legitimate banking 
practice, and did not constitute an interference with the Claimant's right to deal with 
the account as a whole"). The Sea-Land Tribunal found "insufficient evidence that [the 
bank) intentionally obstructed the progress of the [transfer) application, or that it 
interfered unlawfully in any way with [claimant's) use of its account." Id. 
259. Seismographic Service Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 22 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 3, 7S-S1 (19S9-II). See also Sedco, Inc., 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 275 ("When 
an action ... results in an outright transfer of title rather than incidental economic 
injury, ... a taking must be presumed to have occurred."). Other international tribu-
nals have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Mitzi Schoo, Decision No. CZ-279 
(1960), U.S. FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION, FOURTEENTH SEMIANNUAL 
REPORT (1961), at ISO (hereinafter FOURTEENTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT). 
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Other tribunals have applied similar reasoning. The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, interpreting a claim under a 
European human rights instrument providing for the right of 
"peaceful enjoyment of ... possessions," did not fmd indirect 
expropriation to have occurred as a result of land use regula-
tions that affected the claimant's property because, 
although the right [of peaceful enjoyment of posses-
sions] lost some of its substance, it did not disappear 
The Court observe [s] in this connection that the 
[claimants] could continue to utilise their possessions 
and that, although it became more difficult to sell prop-
erties [as a result of the regulations], the possibility of 
selling subsisted. 260 
Likewise, the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission re-
jected a compensation claim based on the government's refusal 
to grant an export license for the claimant's jewelry. 261 
Another component in considering the severity of the· impact 
on property is the duration of the regulation causing the im-
As under U.S. law, however, an action that renders the property entirely worthless 
may require compensation, even if the action was justifiable. For example, in Phelps 
Dodge Corp. v. Iran, 10 Iran·U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 121, 129·130, 25 ILM 619, 625 (1986), 
the Iran·U.S. Claims Tribunal considered a claim arising out of Iran's replacement of 
the managers of the claimant's company with government representatives pursuant to 
a regulation designed to prevent the closure of factories, ensure payments due to work-
ers and protect debts owed to the Government. The Tribunal found an expropriation 
even though it "fully understloodl" the reasons for the regulations. [d. According to 
one member of the Phelps Dodge panel, the Tribunal's award of compensation despite 
the arguable legitimacy of the measures at issue ·was doubtless influenced by its per-
ception that the deprivations were likely to be permanent, even when termed 'provi-
sional'" and that the measure gave the government full control over the property. See 
Aldrich I, supra note 245, at 590. 
260. Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden, (1982) Eur. Ct. H. R. Al52 available in 
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, ECCASE file. See also West v. Multibanco Comermex, SA, 807 
F.2d 820, 831 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987) (no taking under inter-
national law where legitimate exchange controls reduced value of claimant's funds). 
261. Erna Spielberg, Decision No. CZ-2 466 at 146-47 (1961), FOURTEENTH 
SEMIANNUAL REPORT, supra note 259, at 146 (refusal to grant export license for jewelry 
not a taking). Using analogous reasoning, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has refused 
to require compensation for loss of value of a minority shareholder's interest in a com-
pany after the government expropriated the holdings of a majority shareholder because 
the minority shares retained value. See, e.g., Ataollah Golpira v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. 
Trib. Rep. 171 (1983). 
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pact. Thus, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal decisions appear to in-
dicate that "[o]ne or two isolated instances of interference ... do 
not suffice [for a compensable taking]; proof appears to be re-
quired that the blocking is of a more comprehensive nature. "262 
Similarly, when the European Court of Justice denied a com-
pensation claim arising out of the grape restriction, it did so in 
part because the regulatory action was to be valid for only two 
or three years.263 
International decisions have also noted that whether the 
foreign property owner could reasonably have expected the par-
ticular impact on her property is relevant to whether a gov-
ernment regulation gives rise to a right to compensation. For 
example, in Starrett Housing v. Iran, for example, the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal refused to find an indirect expropriation 
based on the inability of the claimant to complete a construc-
tion project due to strikes, work stoppages, the collapse of the 
Iranian banking system and other obstacles that were the re-
sult of the Iranian revolution.264 The Tribunal noted that 
investors in Iran, like investors in all other countries, 
have to assume a risk that the country might experience 
strikes, lock-outs, disturbances, changes of the economic 
and political system and even revolution. That any of 
these risks materialized does not necessarily mean that 
property rights affected by such events can be deemed to 
262. Pellonpaa, supra note 244, at 252 (describing Harza Engineering case). One 
Tribunal member has concluded that 
[plrovisional or temporary assumption of control of an alien's property by 
State action gives rise to liability whenever the deprivation is not merely 
"ephemeral" in the sense that (a) no reasonable prospect exists that control 
will be returned; or (b) that any losses that may ensue during the period of 
control are not compensable to the property owner; or (c) that the control has 
continued for a substantial period of time (perhaps several years) in circum-
stances where the property owner has not behaved in a manner clearly incon-
sistent with a claim of deprivation. 
ALDRICH II, supra note 245, at 217. 
263. Hauer, 1979 E.C.R. at 3749. The US Foreign Claims Settlement Court has 
also rejected compensation claims when national administration of property has been 
only temporary. See, e.g., Public Law 85-604 Panel Opinion No.6, Part 1, ELEVENTH 
SEMIANNUAL REPORT (1959), at 28-29; FOURTEENTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT, at 134-35. 
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have been taken. A revolution as such does not entitle 
investors to compensation under international law. 265 
The same reasoning applies to the possibility of encounter-
ing legitimate government regulations: 
[l]t could be argued that the foreign investor entered the 
state voluntarily, knowing the risk of ... regulatory laws 
being applied against him, and that he should bear the 
risk of such adverse changes as any citizen of the state 
would. It should not be the function of the international 
law to insulate the foreign investor from the regulatory 
regime of the host state's laws.266 
This discussion demonstrates that international law does 
not require compensation for the economic impact of regula-
. tions that are a legitimate exercise of government police power. 
This rule holds particularly true when the regulation leaves 
the affected property with some value and is one that could 
reasonably be expected given the nature of the regulated activ-
ity. Although no international tribunal has yet applied this 
rule to environmental regulations, the following discussion will 
demonstrate that it applies with particular force in such cases. 
265. Id. See also Sedco, Inc., 9 Iran·U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 275 (When property is 
forfeited as the result of a crime, no taking has occurred because "the person(s) affected 
do not rightfully possess title to the property in question."). 
266. SORNARAJAH, supra note 159, at 300. As evidence that this principle is gener· 
ally recognized and thus supports an international norm, Professor Dolzer notes that 
the various domestic orders uniformly indicate, in principle, that no compen· 
sation is due when the measure is necessary in order to protect the public from 
a danger arising from the property; the police power in its various forms gen-
erally overrides property rights, even though certain defmitional issues have 
plagued courts and commentators in this area. When the measure is not 
based on the police power and infringes upon existing use, the state normally 
will enter into conflict with legitimate ... investment backed expectations 
based on property rights!, which) will typically violate the guarantee of private 
property in the absence of compensation. 
Dolzer, supra note 236, at 62. 
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VI. UNDER NAFTA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES ARE A LEGITIMATE 
EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER THAT SHOULD NOT 
NORMALLY GIVE RISE TO A RIGHT TO COMPENSATION 
NAFTA does not define what constitutes "expropriation" or 
a "measure tantamount to ... expropriation." The terms must 
therefore be interpreted consistently with international law 
and in light of their context.267 As demonstrated above, it is "an 
accepted principle of international law that a State is not liable 
for economic injury which is a consequence of bona fide 'regula-
tion' within the accepted police power of states."268 To the best 
of my knowledge, however, no international tribunal has yet 
considered whether this principle applies to environmental 
regulations, although scholars have assumed that it does269 and 
the United States claims to agree. 270 
267. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. 
AlCONF. 39f27 (1969), 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), provides that interpretation of a treaty is to 
take into account "any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties." The NAFTA parties apparently intended the expropriation pro· 
vision to implement international law . In responding to questions from Congress, US 
Trade Representative Kantor stated that NAFTA's expropriation provision would mean 
that Mexico (and presumably Canada and the United States as well) "will now be gov· 
erned by common international law in respect of any nationalizations or expropriations 
of foreign investments." North American Free·Trade Agreement (Nalta) And Supple· 
mental Agreements To The Nalta: Hearing Before The Committee On Ways And Means 
And Its Subcommittee On Trade, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., (Sept. 14, 15, 21, 23, 1993) 
(statement from Micky Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative) (in Arnold & Porter Legis· 
lative History: P.L. 103·182 at 90). 
268. Sedco, Inc., 9 Iran U.S. Iran Cl. Trib. At 275. See generally supra Part V. 
269. See, e.g .. SORNARAJAH, supra note 159. 
270. Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural M-
fairs Alan P. Larson noted the concern that, in its current form, the expropriation pro-
vision of the MAl, which is substantially similar to that of NAFT A, 
could be misinterpreted to go beyond international (and U.S. "takings") law. 
There is consensus among negotiators that any ambiguity on this point must 
be eliminated. Normal regulatory actions, even when they affect the value of an 
investment, should not be considered as an expropriation requiring compensa-
tion. .. . There is emerging consensus that the MAl must include meaningful 
commitments on both labor and environment. We all agree that the MAl must 
not and will not undermine the ability of governments to regulate for protec-
tion of health, safety and the environment. 
Larson, supra note 88, at 51 (in light of the ongoing MAl negotiations, the article was 
not to "be construed as providing formal or final administration positions on specific 
outstanding issues"). In testimony before Congress, Larson reiterated that 
the U.S. delegation has argued that the provision of this proposed agreement 
simply cannot interfere with normal, non-discriminatory regulatory activities 
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A review of the international cases described above shows 
that environmental regulations should be among those legiti-
mate regulations that do not normally give rise to an obligation 
to compensate for devaluation of property. International tri-
bunals have recognized a range of government regulations as 
legitimate exercise of the police power that do not require com-
pensation. These include tax regulations, regulations govern-
ing the transfer and exchange of currency, licensing fees for the 
production of alcoholic beverages, restrictions to protect wine 
production, and export restrictions. 271 Given the undeniable 
impact of human activities on environmental health, and the 
equally obvious relationship between environmental health 
and human welfare, it is clear that regulations to protect the 
environment are at least as legitimate as regulations to ad-
dress any of these other governmental concerns. 
Furthermore, the nature of environmental protection indi-
cates that environmental regulations should be accorded par-
ticular protection from compensation claims. Such regulations 
are an important method of internalizing environmental costs, 
which is an essential component of environmental protection 
and "a general principle ofinternationallaw."272 As the OEeD 
has explained, internalizing environmental costs depends in 
large part on requiring the polluter to "bear the expenses of 
carrying out [pollution prevention) measures decided by public 
authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable 
state. "273 Requiring the government to provide compensation 
for the economic impact of environmental regulations does ex-
actly the opposite, shifting the cost of complying with environ-
mental measures, and thereby the cost of environmental harm, 
onto the general public. Such a shift constitutes a significant 
obstacle to environmental protection. For these reasons, the 
in such areas as health, safety and the environment. In particular, we want to 
ensure that the expropriation article of the MAl cannot be used inappropri· 
ately to challenge regulatory decisions. 
Larson Testimony, supra note 15. 
271. See supra notes 250-258. 
272. International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Coop-
eration, Nov. 30, 1990, pmbl., 30 I.L.M. 733,735-736. See generally supra notes 11-12 
and accompanying text. 
273. OECD Guiding Principles, supra note 11, at par. 4. 
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polluter pays principle and the multitude of international 
agreements for the protection of the environment require that 
governments generally be free to implement environmental 
regulations without having to pay to do so. 
Environmental measures also have special legitimacy in the 
NAFTA regime. Under international law, treaty provisions are 
to be interpreted in light of their context.274 The context of the 
NAFTA expropriation provisions includes the strong emphasis 
that both NAFTA and NAAEC give to environmental protec-
tion. Both agreements strongly promote preserving the right of 
each government to protect the environment, ensuring that 
governments maintain and enforce environmental measures, 
and facilitating the strengthening of laws and regulations to 
protect the environment.275 In the context ofNAFTA, therefore, 
environmental measures are legitimate and the expropriation 
provision should not be interpreted to interfere with the ability 
of governments to implement such measures. 
In addition, NAFTA's investment provisions themselves 
specifically address environmental protection. Those provi-
sions discourage countries from waiving or derogating from 
environmental measures to attract or retain foreign invest-
ment,276 and protect the right of each government to adopt, 
maintain or enforce measures that it considers "appropriate to 
ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in 
a manner sensitive to environmental concerns. "277 Requiring 
compensation for the economic impact of environmental regula-
tions conflicts with these provisions by making it costly for gov-
ernments to enforce or strengthen existing environmental 
measures or to adopt new ones. 
274. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 267, 
art. 31, the terms of a treaty are to be interpreted "in their context," which includes 
"any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in con· 
nexion with the conclusion of the treaty." The NAAEC thus constitutes part of the 
context in which NAFTA terms are to be interpreted. If a global investment agreement 
were to be based on the MAl Negotiating Text, the same context of environmental 
protection would apply there. See supra notes 66·68 and accompanying text. 
275. See supra note 241-266 and accompanying text. 
276. NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1114.2. 
277. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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For all these reasons, there can be no doubt that environ-
mental regulations are a legitimate exercise of governmental 
power that should not normally give rise to a government obli-
gation to compensate for resulting economic losses. Moreover, 
to require compensation would be inconsistent with generally 
accepted intern~tional law concerning environmental protec-
tion, as well as with NAFTA's particular concern that its provi-
sions not interfere with the ability of governments to protect 
the environment. 
Ethyl Corporation's expropriation claim raised a different 
legitimacy issue. Ethyl based its claim in part on an argument 
that Canada's ban was not really an environmental measure. 
Ethyl argued that "[t]he lack of any clear scientific evidence 
throws into doubt whether [the Canadian MM:T measure] is 
necessary to protect human life or health, "278 and claimed that 
the measure was unjustified "since there is no consensus of sci-
entific opinion on the effects of MMT. "279 Similar arguments 
may be expected in support of other NAFTA expropriation 
claims. Such challenges to the scientific basis for an environ-
mental measure raise important issues that directly affect the 
right and ability of governments to protect against the risk of 
environmental harm. 
When a government promotes a measure as protecting 
against a risk to the environment, it is reasonable to require 
that the risk be real, not simply a disguise for a measure in-
tended to achieve another purpose such as expropriation or 
protecting domestic production. This is the scheme established 
by the general exceptions to NAFTA and GATr,280 which recog-
nizes that certain concerns are important enough to justify in-
278. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 14. Ethyl based its claim in large 
part on its characterization of the Canadian ban as a performance requirement. See 
supra note 111 and accompanying text. Although it is beyond the scope of this article 
to analyze this characterization, that argument appears to strain the language of the 
performance requirement provision. Ethyl's claim may have been motivated by a de-
sire to avoid the general exceptions to the NAFTA, which permit measures "related to" 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, by applying the exceptions to the 
performance requirement provision, which limit the exception to measures "necessary 
for" such conservation. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text. 
279. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 14. 
280. See supra note 50. 
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terfering with the free flow of trade, as long as they are not 
really a disguise for measures intended to achieve illegitimate 
goals, such as protecting domestic industry. To distinguish 
between legitimate environmental measures and disguised il-
legitimate measures, it is reasonable to require that the exis-
tence of the risk to the environment be scientifically supported. 
It is essential, however, that the need for scientific support not 
become a requirement that the government demonstrate that 
its measure is supported by "most," "best" or "most widely ac-
cepted" scientific evidence. Such a requirement is contrary to 
the precautionary principle and inconsistent with the nature of 
science. More importantly, it would seriously interfere with 
the ability of governments to protect against risks of environ-
mental harm. 
Any regime that truly allows for protection against the risk 
of environmental harm must recognize the precautionary prin-
ciple, which is based on the premise that science does not al-
ways provide the information or insights necessary to take pro-
tective action effectively or in a timely manner, and that unde-
sirable and potentially irreversible effects may result if action 
is not taken until science does provide such insights. 281 Pursu-
281. The precautionary principle is included in the Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development, which is explicitly reaffirmed in NAFTA's preamble. NAFTA, 
supra note 25, at 297. The Rio Declaration provides the following definition of the 
principle: 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures 
to prevent environmental degradation. 
Rio Declaration, supra note 12, princ. 15. Other agreements recognizing the principle 
include the Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, pmbl., 30 I.L.M. 818; the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. AJAC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.l 
(1992),31 I.L.M. 849 ("The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, 
prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific cer-
tainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures"); the Ministerial 
Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference, Nov. 7, 1990, 1 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. 
L. 473 (1990) (ministers and representatives of 137 countries agree to "protect the 
ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to control ... emission of substances that 
deplete it"); the Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, 
Ministerial Declaration 1 (1987) (ministers of the EEC and eight countries agree that 
the North Sea ecosystem should be protected through the reduction of pollution "even 
where there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between emissions and 
effects ('the principle of precautionary action')"); and the World Charter for Nature, 
G.A. Res. 37n, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. AJRes/37n (1982), 22 
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ant to this principle, coWltries have the right to regulate activi-
ties that may be harmful to the environment even if the scien-
tific evidence concerning the connection between the activity 
and the harm is inadequate or inconclusive-that is, even if 
scientists do not agree or cannot explain exactly whether, how 
or to what degree the harm is caused. 282 This principle has 
been part of domestic and international law for several decades 
and has become a "broadly accepted basis for international ac-
tion.'>283 
The precautionary principle does not ignore science or re-
move scientific inquiry from the effort to identify legitimate 
governmental measures. However, the principle reflects a rec-
I.L.M. 455 (1983) ("Activities which are likely to pose a significant risk to nature shall 
be preceded by an exhaustive examination; their proponents shall demonstrate that 
expected benefits outweigh potential damage to nature, and where potential adverse 
effects are not fully understood, the activities should not proceed."). See also E. Hey, 
The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Cau-
tion, 4 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 308-09 (1992). 
282. In understanding the importance of the precautionary principle, it is helpful to 
remember that the fact that scientific evidence is not conclusive does not mean that it 
is not probative. For example, human health regulations have long been based on 
studies exposing animals to high doses of potentially harmful substances, even when 
there was no conclusive evidence that the regulated substances cause the same harm 
in humans that they do in animals. These regulations are based on the reasonable 
assumption that effects on animals are probative evidence-not conclusive proof-of 
potential effects in humans. See NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, EVERYTHING DOESN'T 
CAUSE CANCER (NIH Pub. No. 90-2039, March, 1990) ("Of the several hundred ... 
chemicals that cause cancer in animals, however, it is not known how many are also 
human carcinogens. Nevertheless, materials that cause cancer in one type of animal 
usually are found to cause cancer in others.... For these and other reasons, we should 
expect animal carcinogens to be capable of causing cancer in humans."). Likewise, 
studies showing harm at high doses are at least evidence of the possibility of -or po-
tential for-harm at low doses. Although they may not prove that harm will occur, 
they support the conclusion that there is a risk. 
283. Philippe Sands, The Greening of International Law: Emerging Principles and 
Rules, 1 GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES J. 293, 301 (1994). See also PHILIPPE SANDS, 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 208-12 (1995) (precautionary 
principle has received widespread support; a "good argument" can be made that it 
reflects customary international law); INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
262 (Tim O'Riordan & James Cameron eds., 1994). In his dissenting opinion in the 1995 
French nuclear testing case, Judge Weeramantry of the International Court of Justice 
noted the importance of the precautionary principle in light of the irreversibility of some 
environmental damage and stated that the precautionary principle is gaining increasing 
support as part of the international law of the environment. Request for an Examination 
of the Situation in Accordance With Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 
1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, 1995 ICJ Reports 288, 342 
(Weeramantry, J., dissenting). 
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ognition that scientific certainty is rare and that advancements 
in scientific knowledge-including knowledge of previously un-
known risks-nearly always begin as controversial theories 
held by a minority of the scientific community. If governments 
must base environmental measures on the scientific conclu-
sions accepted as "best" by the majority of scientists or sup-
ported by the '\veight" of available scientific evidence, they will 
be unable to take precautionary measures to protect against 
risks suggested by new, and frequently controversial, evidence. 
The NAAEC recognizes the right of each Party "to establish 
its own levels of domestic [environmental] protection"284 and 
the importance of achieving "enhanced levels of environmental 
protection. "285 Determining the appropriate level of protection 
in the face of a given risk is a fundamentally political decision 
that only a government that is accountable to those affected by 
the decision can make legitimately. When a nation identifies a 
potential risk to health or the environment, it must decide 
whether and to what extent to take steps to protect against 
that risk. While science plays an important role in identifying 
the existence of a risk, the decision concerning the appropriate 
response to that risk also requires political decisions such as 
weighing how much the citizens of the country (ear the par-
ticular risk and how much, if at all, they value the benefits that 
the risky activity provides. This balancing of potentially com-
peting concerns goes to the heart of what governments do -
determine appropriate actions based on the fears and values of 
citizens. 
Similarly, the ability to enhance environmental protection is 
meaningless unless governments are permitted a full range of 
responses to legitimate environmental risks. Such responses 
must include the right to impose stricter standards to prevent 
harm that is certain to occur, as well as the right to implement 
284. NAAEC, supra note 51, art. 3. 
285. [d. pmbl. 
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measures to protect against possible risks revealed by new or 
controversial scientific evidence. 286 
For these reasons, governments implementing an environ-
mental measure must retain the ability to make judgments 
concerning conflicting evidence or different scientific principles, 
as well as how and when to respond to a legitimate environ-
mental risk. It is therefore inappropriate for an outside body 
that is not accountable to a country's residents, such as an ar-
bitral tribunal, to attempt to weigh competing scientific claims 
to determine whether there is "enough" risk to justify the 
measure in question, or whether the measure is supported by 
the "correct" or "best" or "most accepted" science. 
In light of these considerations, therefore, an arbitral tribu-
nal considering an expropriation claim arising out of a pur-
ported environmental measure should limit its inquiry to de-
termining whether the science underlying the risk determina-
tion has the minimal attributes of scientific inquiry - that is, 
whether the evidence of risk has been derived through the ap-
plication of legitimate scientific methods and procedures, and is 
probative of a potential for adverse effects. 287 This is true even 
if the evidence is controversial or inconclusive. Once an arbi-
tral tribunal has confirmed that the evidence is scientific and 
286. This point can be illustrated by the following example. Suppose two people 
are preparing to leave their homes to go to the office in the morning and each checks 
several weather forecasts before doing so to determine whether to take precautions 
against getting wet from rain. Assume further that these people are seeking to achieve 
different levels of protection: one is willing to Buffer a little wetness but would prefer 
not to get extremely wet; the other considers it extremely important to avoid getting 
wet (i.e .• has chosen a higher level of protection). Four out of five forecasts indicate 
that it is most likely not going to rain during the day. but the fifth. using a new and 
controversial forecasting method. indicates that it is likely to rain. The person who is 
willing to get a little wet is likely to take fewer precautions against rain on the chance 
that the new forecasting method is not as reliable as the method used by the other four 
forecasts. The person with the higher level of protection is more likely to consider the 
possibility that the new method may be accurate and take precautions against rain. 
Forcing the second person to act on the basis of the majority of the evidence effectively 
lowers the level of protection that she is permitted to choose. 
That is not to say. however. that science has no role in this scenario. To be a legiti-
mate basis for protective measures. the new forecasting method must be based on a 
minimally scientific inquiry concerning the weather. instead of on unscientific meth-
ods. such as astrological predictions. 
287. This is an appropriate role for the expert assistance NAFTA makes available 
to arbitral tribunals. NAFTA. supra note 25. art. 1133. 
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probative, it should accept the legitimate environmental basis 
for the measure. Such an analysis will ensure that environ-
mental measures are not disguised expropriations or protec-
tionist measures without interfering with the ability of gov-
ernments to take precautionary measures or their right to ap-
ply the political judgments inherent in setting their appropri-
ate levels of protection against risk. 288 
The SD Myers claim. raises a different issue concerning the 
legitimacy of environmental measures. The Canadian PCB 
export ban was based on Canada's obligations under the Basel 
Convention.289 The Basel Convention forms part of the interna-
tionallaw that applies in interpreting NAFTA's expropriation 
provisions.290 Environmental measures addressing risks recog-
nized in a widely adopted international agreement shall be 
presumed to be legitimate and should not normally give rise to 
an obligation to compensate for their economic impact on in-
vestment. Moreover, requiring governments to pay compensa-
tion to implement such measures interferes with efforts to ad-
dress global environmental problems through international 
consensus. 
International law thus recognizes the right of governments 
to regulate to promote legitimate governmental objectives 
288. These principles would support the right of the governments of Canada and 
Mexico to maintain the measures at issue in the Ethyl and Metalclad cases. Scientific 
studies have apparently shown that airborne manganese poses a risk to human health. 
See supra notes 109 and 133. If these studies are the result of the application of le-
gitimate scientific methods, they should be sufficient to support the environmental 
legitimacy of Canada's ban. Likewise, the study indicating that operation of Metal- . 
clad's waste facility poses a risk to human health and the environment (again assum-
ing that the study is legitimately scientific) weighs against Metalclad's compensation 
claim. Even the existence of scientific studies to the contrary should not prohibit the 
government from taking precautionary measures to protect these serious interests. 
289. See supra notes 142-144. 
290. Article 104 of NAFTA provides that the obligations of several inteinational 
environmental agreements are to prevail over any inconsistent obligations in NAFTA. 
These agreements are the Basel Convention; the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES); the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer; the Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the United States Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste; 
and the Agreement Between the United States and Mexico on Cooperation for the 
protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area. NAFTA, supra 
note 25, art. 104. 
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without incurring an obligation to provide compensation for 
every impact of those regulations on the value of property. 291 
The discussion of international law in Section V also indicates 
that international tribunals have recognized additional factors 
that support governments' right to regulate without having to 
provide compensation. 
The most important such factor is the degree to which the 
regulation affects the value of the investment.292 . As noted 
above, international law considers an indirect expropriation to 
require compensation if it renders property "virtually value-
less."293 In other words, as Ethyl explained in its NAFTA claim, 
international law requires compensation ''where the effect [of 
the regulation] is similar to what might have occurred under 
an outright expropriation."294 Thus, a regulation is not "tanta-
mount to expropriation" if it leaves some value in the invest-
ment in question. 295 
291. See supra Part v. 
292. See supra notes 255 . 263 and accompanying text. 
293. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. This criterion is supported by the 
statement of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal quoted by Ethyl in its Notice of Arbitration: 
"[Mleasures taken by a State can interfere with property rights to such 1m extent that 
these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been expropri-
ated:" Notice of Arbitrations, supra note 107, at 10 (quoting Starrett Housing Corp., 4 
Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. at 154) (emphasis added». 
294. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text. 
295. This factor is relevant to the claims of both Metalclad and Ethyl. It does not 
appear that Metalclad is asserting that the government actually took its property, but 
rather that the refusal of the operating permit and the environmental zoning regula-
tion affected the economic value of the waste treatment facility. Likewise, Ethyl ad-
mits that the sale of MMT constitutes only half the revenue of Ethyl Canada. See 
supra note 112. Canada's law thus did not deprive Ethyl of all economic benefit of its 
investment. Therefore, even under Ethyl's own interpretation of international law, 
Ethyl's claim was unsupported. 
Ethyl attempted to strengthen its claim by arguing that the loss of 50% of its reve-
nues would cause the parent corporation to reevaluate whether to continue operations 
in Canada. See supra note 113. International tribunals have long recognized that this 
fact is completely irrelevant to the compensation determination. See, e.g., Kugele, 6 
Ann. Dig. At 69. Ethyl also padded its claim with allegations of negative effects on its 
"worldwide sales." This approach hugely multiplies the disincentive to achieving the 
goals of strengthening environmental protection. Claims like Ethyl's would make 
governments unwilling ever to take measures to protect against newly-identified risks, 
because to do so would make them potentially liable for harm to sales and reputation 
in any country that has not already implemented measures. This is clearly inconsis-
tent with the goals of NAFTA to maintain and strengthen environmentally protective 
measures. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text. 
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Another factor that is relevant under international law is 
whether regulations affecting the investment were 
foreseeable.296 This factor weighs against requiring compensa-
tion in the case of most environmental laws, including those at 
issue in the NAFTA cases described above.297 Harm to the en-
vironment is universally recognized as an extremely serious 
issue and, as such, is a common subject of government regula-
tion. NAFTA's emphasis on maintaining and strengthening 
environmental protection gives notice of the three govern-
ments' intention to implement environmental measures. It can 
hardly be considered a surprise when they do so. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The NAFTA claims described in this Article demonstrate 
the need for clarification of the NAFTA expropriation provision 
as it applies to environmental measures. International law has 
long supported the right of governments to implement legiti-
mate measures in the exercise of their police powers without 
incurring an obligation to compensate if such measures dimin-
ish the value of foreign investments. General principles of en-
vironmentallaw and protection, as well as the specific empha-
sis that NAFTA places on environmental protection, make 
clear that this right applies with particular force with respect 
to legitimate regulations protecting the environment. For 
these reasons, the parties to NAFTA and negotiators of other 
regional or global investment agreements should make explic-
itly clear that protection against expropriation does not include 
a right to compensation for diminished value resulting from the 
effects of legitimate environmental regulations. 
296. See supra notes 264-266 and accompanying text. 
297. When Metalclad undertook to upgrade and operate the hazardous waste facil~ 
ity, it was well aware that its activities were subject to regulation. In addition to being 
aware that its activities were subject to regulation in Mexico, see supra note 93 and 
accompanying text, Metalclad should have been aware that similar activities are 
regulated in the United States. Nor can Ethyl claim surprise that the government 
promulgated new regulations concerning the production and sale of gasoline additives, 
because these activities have long been the subject of government regulation, both in 
Canada and the United States. The long-standing laws regulating PCB use and dis-
posal in both the United States and Canada, as well as the existence of the Basel Con-
vention, gave SD Myers ample notice that its activities were subject to regulation. 
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To truly enable governments to protect the environment, it 
is essential to make explicit the following points: 
• Legitimate environmental measures do not create a 
right to compensation for any decrease in the value 
of a foreign investment affected by the measures 
• Legitimate environmental measures include meas-
ures implemented pursuant to the precautionary 
principle 
• Governments must have the right to establish their 
own level of protection against risks of environ-
mental harm 
• Any test of the legitimacy of environmental meas-
ures must not require the government to prove that 
a risk of harm is supported by the ''best,'' "most" or 
"most widely accepted" science; it is sufficient if the 
application of legitimate scientjfic methods and pro-
cedures demonstrates a potential for adverse envi-
ronmental effects. 
Creating a right to compensation for an environmental law's 
economic impacts on foreign investors would severely chill the 
ability of governments to protect the environment. Such a re-
gime would be akin to a legally enforced protection racket-the 
government would be forced to pay those who would harm the 
environment to stop or limit their harmful activities. 
Fortunately, international law does not support such a 
scheme. Rather, it recognizes that legitimate governmental 
regulations do not normally give rise to a right to compensa-
tion, and that environmental protection is an important subject 
of government action, even when foreign investors must bear 
an economic burden as a result of that action. It is crucial that 
governments J'legotiating new trade or investment agreements 
recognize these principles and explicitly ensure that such 
agreements do not create new obstacles to the ability of gov-
ernments to protect the environment through legitimate envi-
ronmentallaws and regulations. 
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